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Three days after the September 11 attacks, when al Qaeda terrorists
hijacked and crashed four commercial jetliners into the World Trade Center,
the Pentagon, and the Pennsylvania countryside, killing over 3100 people,'
Congress passed a joint resolution authorizing the use of military force
against those responsible.2 President George W. Bush responded by sending
troops to Afghanistan to fight al Qaeda and its supporter, the Taliban
regime.' During the military operation that ensued, thousands of prisoners
were captured by allied and American forces.4 Many of those captured are
* Senior Advisor to the Deputy Assistant Secretary for Law Enforcement and Security,
Department of the Interior. J.D., 1983, Catholic University Law School. The views expressed
herein are solely those of the author.
1. See Michael Grumwald, Bush Promises Retribution, WASH. POST, Sept. 12, 2001, at
Al; T.R. Reid, Tape Proves Bin Laden Is Guilty, Britain Says, WASH. POST, Nov. 15, 2001, at
A29.
2. Authorization for the Use of Military Force, Pub. L. No. 107-40, § 2(a), 115 Stat. 224,
224 (2001) (to be codified at 50 U.S.C. § 1541); see Neil A. Lewis, Measure Backing Bush's
Use of Force Is as Broad as a Declaration of War, Experts Say, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 18, 2001,
at B7.
3. Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 296 F.3d 278, 280 (4th Cir. 2002), cert. granted, No. 03-6696,
2004 WL 42546 (U.S. Jan. 9, 2004). The U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari in the case as
this Article went to press.
4. See Handling John Walker, WASH. POST, Jan. 4,2002, at A26 (noting that the military
have been "dealing with thousands of captured fighters in Afghanistan - from all over the
place"). Throughout this article, the terms "prisoner," "detainee," and "captive" are used
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being held at the U.S. naval base in Guantanamo Bay, Cuba.5 The options
faced by these prisoners include prosecution before military commissions,6
repatriation to their countries of origin, release if they are determined not to
be law enforcement threats,7 or detention until the end of hostilities.8
In connection with these detentions, some of the captives, described as
enemy combatants,9 filed petitions for writs of habeas corpus in the U.S.
interchangeably.
5. By December 2003, the naval base at Guantanamo Bay, which not only has been
identified as a site where military commissions will convene, but also as a possible terrorist
penal colony, was holding an estimated 660 men from forty-two countries. See John Mintz,
Extended Detention in Cuba Mulled, WASH. POST, Feb. 13, 2002, at A 16; Katharine Q. Seelye,
Guantanamo Bay Faces Sentence of Life as Permanent U.S. Prison, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 16,
2002, at Al [hereinafter Seeyle, Permanent US. Prison]; U.S. to Release 140 from
Guantanamo, WASH. POST, Dec. 1, 2003, at A7. The base may eventually hold 2000 detainees.
Paisley Dodds, Guantanamo Detainees Still There, Future Still Uncertain, SANMATEO COUNTY
TIMES, Oct. 7, 2002, at A26.
6. See John Mintz, 6 Could Be Facing Military Tribunals, July 4, 2003, at Al (reporting
that "President Bush designated six suspected Al Qaeda terrorists as eligible for trial before
military tribunals... bringing the United States to the brink of its first prosecution of enemy
prisoners since the aftermath of World War I"); John Mintz, Some Detainees May Be Held
Even IfAcquitted, WASH. POST, Mar. 29, 2002, at A7 (reporting that "U.S. officials say privately
that they expect only a small number of [detainees] will face charges before the tribunals"). The
trials are expected to take place at the naval base in Cuba. John Mintz, Prosecutor Says
Tribunals Will Be Fair Trials, WASH. POST, May 23, 2003, at A3. In December 2003, two of
the detainees designated to be tried before a military commission were assigned counsel. John
Mintz, Guantanamo Bay Detainee Is First to Be Given a Lawyer, WASH. POST, Dec. 4, 2003,
at A8; John Mintz, Hearing Ordered for Terrorism Detainee, WASH. POST, Dec. 19, 2003, at
A19.
7. See, e.g., John Mintz, 4 Prisoners Sent Home, WASH. POST, Oct. 29, 2002, at A15
(reporting release of four prisoners); John Mintz & Glenn Kessler, U.S. to Release About 15
Detainees at Guantanamo, WASH. POST, May 6, 2003, at Al (reporting upcoming release of
about fifteen prisoners); April Witt & Marc Kaufman, Afghans to Free Prisoners from
Guantanamo, WASH. POST, Mar. 25, 2003, at A6 (reporting return of eighteen prisoners to
Afghanistan).
8. See Lee A. Casey et al., By the Laws of War, They Aren't POWs, WASH. POST, Mar. 3,
2002, at B3; Seelye, Permanent U.S. Prison, supra note 5, at Al; Katharine Q. Seelye, Rumsfeld
Lists Outcomes For Detainees Held In Cuba, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 27, 2002, at Al0; Joanne
Mariner, Guantanamera: The Continuing Debate over the Legal Status of Guantanamo
Detainees, at http://writ.corporate.findlaw.com/mariner/20020311.html (Mar. 11, 2002). One
commentator has noted that "the al Qaeda and at least some of the Taliban captives may be too
dangerous ever to be released. Assuming that many or most of them will not be subject to the
death penalty, that commits the United States to detaining them indefinitely." Michael C. Doff,
What Is an "Unlawful Combatant, " and Why It Matters, at http://writ.corporate.findlaw.com/
dorf/20020123.html (Jan. 23, 2002).
9. See Gina Holland, Lawyers: U.S. Should Explain Citizen Jailings, MIAMIHERALD, Aug.
10, 2002 (describing detainees held in Guantanamo Bay as enemy combatants). Contra Rasul
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federal courts, challenging the authority of the United States to hold them
without charges and deny them access to lawyers.1" Additionally, in April
2002, the government determined that Yaser Esam Hamdi, one of the
detainees at the naval base in Guantanamo Bay, was a U.S. citizen." As a
result, he was flown to the naval brig in Norfolk, Virginia, where Pentagon
officials indicated he would continue to be detained as an enemy
combatant.' 2 The following month, Jose Padilla, an American citizen also
known as Abdulah al-Muhajir, was arrested at O'Hare International Airport
in Chicago on a material witness warrant in connection with a terrorist plot
to detonate a radioactive bomb in the United States. 3 In June 2002, Padilla
v. Bush, 215 F. Supp. 2d 55, 67 n.12 (D.D.C. 2002), aff'd sub. nom. A] Odah v. United States,
321 F.3d 1134 (D.C. Cir. 2003), cert. granted, 124 S. Ct. 534 (2003) (mem.) (No. 03-334)
(declining to label some of the detainees as enemy combatants and instead identifying them as
aliens). The term "enemy combatant" appears to have been taken from Ex Parte Quirin, 317
U.S. 1 (1942), a case discussed infra text accompanying notes 96-112. See Gary Solis, Even
a "Bad Man" Has Rights, WASH. POST., June 25, 2002, at A19 (noting that "the term [enemy
combatant] appears to have been appropriated from Ex Parte Quirin"); see also Adam Roberts,
The Prisoner Question, WASH. POST, Feb. 3, 2002, at BI (noting that while the term "unlawful
combatant" is not found in any treaty, "the concept of 'unlawful combatant,' or something very
like it, is implicit in the definitions of unlawful combatants that appear in the key treaties").
10. See Rasul, 215 F. Supp. 2d at 55; Coalition of Clergy v. Bush, 189 F. Supp. 2d 1036
(C.D. Cal. 2002), aff'd inpart, vacated inpart, 310F.3d 1153 (9th Cir. 2002), and cert. denied,
123 S. Ct. 2073 (2003) (mem.) (Coalition of Clergy 1).
11. See Carol Rosenberg, Public Defender Makes Plea for American Detainee to Consult
a Lawyer, MIAMI HERALD, Apr. 28, 2002, at Al. Hamndi was born in Baton Rouge, Louisiana.
Carol Rosenberg, Detainee Was a Traveler, Not a Terrorist, MIAMI HERALD, June 4, 2002, at
Al. See generally Frances S. Sellers, A Citizen on Paper Has No Weight, WASH. POST, Jan.
19, 2003, at B1 (discussing Hamdi's "paper citizenship" and the evolving concept of
citizenship).
12. Sonja Barasic, Government Objects to Lawyer Meeting with American-Born Prisoner
Captured with Taliban, Associated Press, May 24, 2002. Hamdi reportedly was the second
American-born prisoner captured in Afghanistan. The first was John Walker Lindh. See
Handling John Walker, WASH. POST, Jan. 4, 2002, at A26. On February 5, 2002, Lindh was
charged in a ten-count indictment with conspiracy to murder U.S. nationals and to provide
material support and resources to the Taliban and terrorist groups, and also possession of
firearms and destructive devices in furtherance of crimes of violence. See Brooke A. Masters
& Dan Eggen, Lindh Indicted on Conspiracy, Gun Charges, WASH. POST, Feb. 6, 2002, at Al.
On July 15, 2002, he pled guilty to wilfully supplying services to the Taliban and carrying an
explosive device while committing a felony; on October 2, 2002, he was sentenced to twenty
years in prison. See 'I Made a Mistake by Joining the Taliban,' WASH. POST, Oct. 5, 2002, at
Al; Tom Jackman, In Deal, Lindh Pleads Guilty to Aiding Taliban, WASH. POST, July 16,2002,
at A9.
13. See Dan Eggen & Susan Schmidt, "Dirty Bomb" Plot Uncovered, U.S. Says, WASH.
POST, June 11, 2002, at Al; Benjamin Weiser & Dana Canedy, Lawyer Plans Challenge to
Detention of Suspect, N.Y. TIMES, June 12, 2002, at A24.
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was designated as an enemy combatant by President Bush and transferred to
the custody of the Defense Department. 4  Government officials
subsequently indicated that while neither Hamdi nor Padilla would be tried
before military commissions, 5 they could be detained until the cessation of
the war on terrorism.' 6  Like the captives in Cuba, Hamdi and Padilla
challenged their detentions by filing petitions for writs of habeas corpus. 7
This Article analyzes the various legal challenges made by citizens and
14. See John Mintz, Al Qaeda Suspect Enters Legal Limbo, WASH. POST, June 11, 2002,
at A10. As previously noted, Jose Padilla is also known as Abdullah al-Muhajir. To aid the
reader, this Article will refer to him as Padilla rather than Abdullah al-Muhajir.
15. Military Tribunal Won't Try Padilla, Justice Dept. Says, WASH. POST, June 15, 2002,
at A10 (reporting that the Department of Justice advised lawmakers the government would not
bring Padilla before a military tribunal); John Mintz, American-Born War Detainee Won't Be
Prosecuted, MIAMI HERALD, Apr. 9, 2002, at A13 (reporting that, as an American citizen,
Hamdi could not be tried before a military tribunal). On November 13, 2001, a little more than
two months after the September 11 attacks, President Bush signed a military order authorizing,
at his discretion, the detention by the military and the trial of non-U.S. citizens before military
commissions if they are found to be members of al Qaeda, to have engaged in acts of
international terrorism aimed at the United States, or to have harbored such persons. See
Military Order of November 13, 2001: Detention, Treatment, and Trial of Certain Non-Citizens
in the War Against Terrorism, 66 Fed. Reg. 57,833 (Nov. 16, 2001) [hereinafter Military
Order]. The background leading to the promulgation of this order is discussed at infra text
accompanying notes 33-36.
16. See, e.g., Brooke A. Masters, Access to Lawyer Ordered for Detainee, WASH. POST,
May 30, 2002, at A7 (reporting government lawyers maintained that Hamdi was "an unlawful
enemy combatant who can be held indefinitely without being charged or given a lawyer");
Christopher Newton, American Terror Suspect to Be Held Indefinitely, Associated Press, June
13, 2002 (reporting that in a closed meeting of the Senate Judiciary Committee, the Department
of Justice maintained the United States can "hold Padilla until the President decides the war
against terrorism is over"). It was further reported that the administration was considering'
creating military detention camps for American citizens designated enemy combatants. See
Anita Ramasastry, Do Hamdi and Padilla Need Company? Why Attorney General Ashcroft's
Plan to Create Internment Camps for Supposed Citizen Combatants Is Shocking and Wrong,
at http://writ.corporate.findlaw.com/ramasastryl 20020821.html (Aug. 21, 2002) (noting that
"Attorney General Ashcroft and the White House [were] considering creating military detention
camps for all U.S. citizens deemed by the administration to be enemy combatants").
17. See infra Part VIII. On June 23, 2003, President Bush designated Ali Saleh Kahlah Al-
Marri, a native of Qatar residing in the United States, as an enemy combatant. Josh Meyer,
Suspect Is Declared an Enemy Combatant, L.A. TIMES, June 24, 2003, at Al. Al-Marri, who
had been in civilian custody under an indictment that charged him with making false statements
to FBI agents during the investigation of the September 11 attacks, false statements to a bank,
identity fraud, and access device fraud, was transferred to the custody of the Department of
Defense after the government dropped the charges. Id.; Press Release, U.S. Attorney's Office,
Central District of Illinois, West Peoria Man Charged in Central Illinois with Making False
Statements in Investigation of September lth Terror Attacks, available at http://www.
usdoj.gov/usao/ilc/index.html (May 22, 2003).
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noncitizens designated as enemy combatants.' 8 First, the Article provides
the backdrop against which enemy combatant designations have been made.
Next, the Article discusses the nature of the current conflict, the legal
paradigms being used to respond to the terrorism threat, and the treatment
of those detained during war. Because the legal challenges made to the
enemy combatant designation by those detained principally have been
presented through petitions for writs of habeas corpus, the Article provides
a brief historical overview of the writ, together with its present statutory
incarnation. A discussion follows of key U.S. Supreme Court and lower
court decisions addressing the application of the writ of habeas corpus to
citizens and aliens in times of war, as well as the designation of American
citizens as enemy combatants during such a time. Lastly, the Article notes
some trends in the jurisprudence in this area of the law.
II. Background
During the past decade, the United States has been the target of terrorist
attacks to its interests and citizens abroad.' 9 In June 1996, a truck bomb
exploded near the Khobar Towers military complex in Saudi Arabia, killing
nineteen Americans and wounding 372 others.2" In August 1998, terrorists
bombed the American embassies in Nairobi, Kenya, and Dar es Salaam,
Tanzania, killing 224 - including twelve Americans - and wounding
4600.21 In October 2000, terrorists bombed the American destroyer U.S.S.
Cole in Adan Harbor, Yemen, killing seventeen sailors.22
18. On March 19,2003, as part of Operation Iraqi Freedom, the United States launched air
and ground attacks on Iraq. Rajiv Chandrasekaran & Thomas E. Ricks, U.S. Opens War with
Strikes on Baghdad Aimed at Hussein, WASH. POST, Mar. 20, 2003, at Al. In connection with
this war, it appears that Iraqi prisoners will be treated as prisoners of war unless the U.S.
government deems them unlawful combatants, in which case the government may send them
to Guantanamo Bay or other holding facilities. Peter Baker, U.S. Forces Round Up Civilian
Suspects, WASH. POST, Mar. 31,2003, at Al; Diane F. Orentlicher& Robert K. Goldman, Rules
Between Guerilla Warfare and War Crimes, WASH. POST, Apr. 6, 2003, at B2. This Article
focuses only on those prisoners that the government has detained or may detain in connection
with the attacks by al Qaeda on September 11.
19. See Note, Responding to Terrorism: Crime, Punishment, and War, 115 HARv. L. REV.
1217, 1217 (2002) (noting that "[t]he United States, its citizens, and its interests abroad have
long been targets of terrorism").
20. Press Release, U.S. Department of Justice, Khobar Towers Release (June 21, 2001),
available at http://www.fbi.gov.
21. See A Verdict Against Terrorism, WASH. POST, May 30, 2001, at A18.
22. See Kamran Khan & Rajiv Chandrasekaran, Cole Suspect Turned Over by Pakistan,
WASH. POST, Oct. 28, 2001, at Al; U.S. Seeks to Resume Probe of Cole Blast, WASH. POST,
Aug. 22, 2001, at A15. In May 2003, the government returned an indictment against two
Yemeni men in connection with the bombing. Eric Lichtblau, U.S. Indicts 2 Men for Attack on
Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2003
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On September 11, 2001, the focus returned to the mainland 23 when
members of al Qaeda, Osama bin Laden's terrorist organization, 24 hij acked
four commercial jetliners and crashed them into the Pentagon, the World
Trade Center, and the Pennsylvania countryside, killing more than 3100
people.2 ' The government's response was swift. Three days after the
attacks, Congress passed a joint resolution authorizing the use of "all
necessary and appropriate force against those nations, organizations, or
persons [the President] determine[d] planned, authorized, committed, or
aided the terrorist attacks that occurred... or harbored such organizations
or persons. 26 Congress also provided forty billion dollars to help cover the
cost of rebuilding and military action. 27 Additionally, as part of a broad and
coordinated economic, intelligence, diplomatic, and military effort, the
American Ship in Yemen, N.Y. TIMES, May 16, 2003, at A17.
23. More than eight years before, in February 1993, terrorists bombed the World Trade
Center killing six people, hospitalizing more than one thousand others, and causing hundreds
of millions of dollars worth of damage. See United States v. Salameh, 152 F.3d 88 (2d Cir.
1998) (affirming convictions of defendants on various charges relating to the bombing of the
World Trade Center).
24. As a government official explained:
"AI-Qaeda" ("The Base") was developed by Osama Bin Laden and others.., to
support the war effort in Afghanistan against the Soviets. The resulting "victory"
in Afghanistan gave rise to the overall "Jihad" (Holy War) movement. Trained
Mujahedin fighters from Afghanistan began returning to such countries as Egypt,
Algeria, and Saudi Arabia, with extensive "jihad" experience and the desire to
continue the "jihad". This antagonism began to be refocused against the U.S. and
its allies.
The Global Reach of Al-Qaeda: Hearing Before the Senate Subcomm. on Int'l Operations &
Terrorism, Comm. on Foreign Relations, 107th Cong. 4 (2001) (prepared statement of J.T.
Caruso, Acting Assistant Director, Counterterrorism Division, FBI) [hereinafter Caruso I
Statement].
25. See Michael Grumwald, Bush Promises Retribution, WASH. POST, Sept. 12, 2001, at
Al; Brooke A. Masters, Invoking Allah, Terror Suspect Enters No Plea, WASH. POST, Jan. 3,
2002, at Al (noting that the hijacked jets that crashed into the World Trade Center, the
Pentagon, and the Pennsylvania countryside killed more than 3100 people). Bin Laden was
charged previously in the 1998 bombings of the American embassies in East Africa. See United
States v. Bin Laden, 132 F. Supp. 2d 168 (S.D.N.Y. 2001).
26. Authorization for the Use of Military Force, Pub. L. No. 107-40, § 2(a), 115 Stat. 224,
224 (2001) (to be codified at 50 U.S.C. § 1541); see Thomas Geraghty, Comment, The
Criminal-Enemy Distinction: Prosecuting a Limited War Against Terrorism Following the
September 11, 2001 Terrorist Attacks, 33 MCGEORGE L. REV. 551,568-74 (2002) (discussing
in detail language of authorization).
27. See John Lancaster & Helen Dewar, Congress Clears Use of Force, WASH. POST, Sept.
16, 2001, at All; Neil A. Lewis, Measure Backing Bush's Use of Force Is as Broad as a
Declaration of War, Experts Say, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 18, 2001, at B7.
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government undertook a course of action intended to enlist the cooperation
and support of other countries. 8
On the domestic front, the Bush administration implemented a number of
measures. On September 20, 2001, President Bush announced the creation
of the Office of Homeland Security.29 Three days later, on September 23,
the President directed certain financial institutions to freeze the assets of
fifteen organizations and twelve individuals suspected of funding
terrorism. 3° Close to a month later, on October 26, 2001, Bush signed the
USA Patriot Act of 2001,31 legislation intended to help authorities "track and
disrupt the operations of suspected terrorists in the United States. 32
Then, on November 13, 2001, citing the "extraordinary emergency"
presented as a result of the attacks and the possibility that future attacks
28. See Ben Barber, Powell Sets Up Global Anti-Terror Coalition, WASH. TIMES, Sept. 13,
2001, at Al; Steven Mufson & Alan Sipress, Battle Called 'A War of Will and Mind,' WASH.
POST, Sept. 20,2001, at Al ("Bush and senior administration officials spent another day lining
up international support for military, financial and economic actions that the president said
would be designed to locate terrorist leaders, 'get them out of their caves, get them moving, cut
off their finances."'); Bob Woodward, 50 Countries Detain 360 Suspects at CIA's Behest,
WASH. POST, Nov. 22, 2001, at A1 (reporting that a "senior White House official said.., the
intelligence coalition is as important as the military and diplomatic coalitions involved in the
war on terrorism"). These efforts have borne fruit. See, e.g., U.S. Dep't of State, Patterns of
Global Terrorism: 2001, at iii (2002), available at http://www.state.gov.documents
organization/10286.pdf (noting that "[als a result of the Coalition's operations in Afghanistan,
al-Qaida and Taliban leaders are now either captured, killed, or on the run"); Kawaguchi
Promises Ashcroft Help with "Terrorism" Fight, MALAYSIAN NATIONAL NEWS AGENCY, Oct.
21, 2002 (reporting that Japan's foreign minister advised U.S. Attorney General John Ashcroft
that "Japan will continue cooperating with the United States to fight against terrorism"); Terror
Suspects Arrested Globally, WASH. TIMES, Jan. 20, 2002, at A7 (reporting that "U.S.-coalition
pressed its crackdown on the al Qaeda network.. . with the arrests of suspected terrorists in
Afghanistan, Spain, Britain, Malaysia and Indonesia").
29. See President Bush's Address on Terrorism Before a Joint Meeting of Congress, N.Y.
TIMES, Sept. 21, 2001, at B4. In June 2002, President Bush proposed that the Office of
Homeland Security be converted into a new government department, and in November 2002,
he signed a security bill establishing the Department of Homeland Security. See Joseph Curl,
Bush Proposes New Security Agency, WASH. TIMES, June 7, 2002, at Al; John Mintz,
Homeland Agency Created: Bush Signs Bill to Combine Federal Security Functions, WASH.
POST, Nov. 26,2002, at Al. The new department came into existence on January 24,2003. See
U.S. Department of Homeland Security, available at http://www.dhs.gov.
30. See Exec. Order No. 13,224,66 Fed. Reg. 49,079 (Sept. 23,2001); Mike Allen & Paul
Blustein, Foreign Banks Urged to Help Freeze Assets of 27 Entities, WASH. POST, Sept. 25,
2001, at Al; John Mintz & David S. Hilzenrath, Bush's Target List Draws Path to Bin Laden's
Backers, WASH. POST, Sept. 25, 2001, at A9.
31. Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat. 272.
32. Jonathan Krim & Robert O'Harrow Jr., Bush Signs into Law New Enforcement Era,
WASH. POST, Oct. 27, 2001, at A6.
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could "place at risk the continuity of the operations of the United States
government,"33 and interpreting the events of September 11 as acts of war,34
President Bush issued a military order empowering him to detain and direct
the military prosecutions of non-U.S. citizens determined to be members of
al Qaeda, who had engaged in or conspired to participate in international
terrorism, or had harbored such persons.35 Administration officials argued
that because the United States was in a state of war, it was "important to
give the [P]resident of the United States the maximum flexibility consistent
with his constitutional authority."36
Unlike other measures taken by the administration following September
11, the issuance of this order created significant controversy, both abroad
and at home.37 The question arose whether those detained in Guantanamo
33. Military Order, supra note 15, § 1(c),(g).
34. See Samantha A. Pitts-Kiefer, Note, J6se Padilla: Enemy Combatant or Common
Criminal, 48 VILL. L. REv. 875, 899 (2003) (noting that "Congress authorized the use of the
armed forces in a Joint Declaration. Not only did the U.S. government view the conflict as a
war, but the international community embraced this conflict as a war in unequivocal terms,
never before invoked.") (citation omitted); Mike Allen & Susan Schmidt, Bush Defends Secret
Tribunals for Terrorism Suspects, WASH. POST, Nov. 30, 2001, at A28 (quoting President Bush
as saying, "The enemy has declared war on us, and we must not let foreign enemies use the
forums of liberty to destroy liberty itself."'). It has been noted that "if this attack were not
sufficient by itself to initiate a state of war, Osama bin Laden had previously declared war
against the United States; in 1998, he called for the killing of American civilians as well as
soldiers, 'in any country in which it is possible to do it."' Michael I. Meyerson, The War on
Terrorism and the Constitution, 35 MD. B.J. 16, 19 (2002).
35. See Military Order, supra note 15, §§ 2-4. The U.S. government promulgated
regulations governing the procedures to be followed by the military commissions in March
2002. See Katharine Q. Seelye, Government Sets Rules for Military on War Tribunals, N.Y.
TIMES, Mar. 21, 2002, at Al.
36. Military Commissions: Hearing Before the Senate Comm. on Armed Servs., 107th
Cong. 1 (2001) (statement of Donald H. Rumsfeld, Secretary of Defense, and Paul D.
Wolfowitz, Deputy Secretary of Defense), available athttp://www.senate.gov/-armedservices/
statemnt/200l/011212wolf&rums.pdf; John Ashcroft, Attorney General, Department of Justice
Press Conference, Military Tribunals For Terrorists (Nov. 14, 2001), at http://jurist.law.pitt.
edu/terrorism/terrorismmilash. htm. See generally William Glaberson, Closer Look at New Plan
for Trying Terrorists, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 15,2001, at B6 (reporting how military "tribunals have
a long international history" and "have been used in this country at least since 1780, when
George Washington appointed a board of officers to try Maj. John Andre, a British spy who
slipped behind American lines to gather information from Benedict Arnold"); Alberto R.
Gonzales, Martial Justice, Full and Fair, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 30, 2001, at A27 (arguing that
"[m]ilitary commissions are consistent with American historical and constitutional traditions"
and that the "use of such commissions has been consistently upheld by the Supreme Court").
37. See, e.g., SamDillon & Donald G. McNeil Jr., Spain Sets Hurdle forExtraditions, N.Y.
TIMES, Nov. 24,2001, at Al (reporting that officials indicated "Spain [would] not extradite the
eight men it [had] charged with complicity in the Sept. 11 attacks unless the United States
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Bay were prisoners of war.38 Further, following the administration's naming
of Hamdi and Padilla as enemy combatants, a spirited discourse emerged
regarding both the authority of the Executive Branch to make such
designations, as well as the role of the courts in safeguarding the rights of
American citizens.39 Before addressing these and other important issues
raised by the detentions, a brief discussion of the nature of the current armed
conflict, the legal paradigms that are being applied to it and the terrorism
threat in general, and the legal principles governing the treatment of persons
during such a conflict is instructive.
agree[d] that they would be tried by a civilian court and not by the military tribunals envisioned
by President Bush"); Richard A. Greene, Analysis: Military Tribunals, BBC News, Jan. 11,
2002 ("Few White House proposals in the war on terror have caused as much controversy as
President George W. Bush's order to try suspected terrorists in military tribunals rather than the
regular court system.") (on file with author).
38. See, e.g., Paisley Dodds, Some Held in Cuba May Be Shipped Home, CHI. SUN-TIMES,
Jan. 27, 2002, at 4 (reporting that "[sleveral governments [were] demanding the United States
give the captives prisoner of war status under the Geneva Conventions, which rule[d] out trial
by military tribunal"); John Mintz, On Detainees, U.S. Faces Legal Quandary, WASH. POST,
Jan. 27, 2002, at A22 (reporting that according to a number of experts in international law,
"[m]ost members of Osama bin Laden's al Qaeda movement detained at the Guantanarno Bay
naval base probably do not deserve to be labeled prisoners of war under the Geneva
Conventions and legal precedents").
39. Compare Philip Heyman, The Power to Imprison, WASH. POST, July 7, 2002, at B7
(noting that "the administration has not assumed the burden of showing Congress or the courts
the inadequacy of familiar methods of handling dangerous people before resorting to indefinite
imprisonment of citizens without a warrant, trial or judicial approval"), and John Payton, The
Rule of Law, WASH. POST, Aug. 25, 2002, at B7 (arguing that "[i]f, in response to the challenge
of terrorism, we transform ourselves into a society that eliminates the rle of law and
concentrates in the president unchecked power to detain people without charges or judicial
review, we will have become our antithesis"), and Editorial, Still No Lawyers, WASH. POST, July
9, 2002, at A20 (recognizing that "[t]here are no easy answers to the question of what rules
should govern" the cases involving Messrs. Hamdi and Padilla but also maintaining that "the
right answer cannot be that the president's power to detain Americans during wartime answers
to no meaningful oversight by the courts and that detainees have no chance to be heard"), with
Kate O'Beirne, It's a War, Stupid, NAT'L REvIEw, Sept. 16, 2002, at 22, available at http://
www.nationalreview.com (criticizing legal analysts and editorial writers who maintain that
President's "well-established authority to detain enemy combatants in military custody poses
a monumental threat to our liberties"), and Laura Sullivan, Antiterrorism's Methodology in the
Spotlight, BALT. SUN, Sept. 1, 2002, at IF (reporting that the Department of Justice's Assistant
Attorney General for the Criminal Division has stated that in light of the war, "'[t]he judicial
model does not work. Judges are not able to roam around in Afghanistan and get in the middle
of the battlefield and decide whether a particular enemy soldier' should be afforded
constitutional rights."), and Minami Wade, Enemy Combatants Do Not Deserve Same Status
as Criminal Defendants, NAVY TIMES, July 29,2002 (noting that the "classification of captured
personnel as enemy combatants is an executive prerogative. Attempts to subvert this
prerogative through thejudiciary are spurious and undermine our ability to prosecute the war.").
Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2003
OKLAHOMA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 56:565
III. The Nature of the Conflict, Legal Paradigms Being Used to Address
It, and the Treatment of Captives During War
In broad terms, the threat to the United States from international terrorism
can be partitioned into three categories: the radical international jihad
movement, states that sponsor international terrorism, and terrorist
organizations.4" The current armed conflict can be traced to the first
category, the radical international jihad movement, exemplified by Sunni
Islamic extremists such as bin Laden and his organization, al Qaeda.4' It is
estimated that tens of thousands of individuals trained in al Qaeda terrorist
camps in Afghanistan and that, as a result, the group can draw upon
thousands of supporters when planning, raising funds, and engaging in
attacks.42 Further, a study of al Qaeda's operations has revealed a highly
40. Combating Terrorism: Protecting the United States, Parts I and II: Hearings Before
the House Subcomm. on Nat'l Security, Veterans Affairs and Int'l Relations, Comm. on Gov't
Reform, 107th Cong. 155 (2002) (statement of James Caruso, Deputy Executive Assistant
Director for Counter Terrorism, Federal Bureau of Investigation) [hereinafter Caruso lI
Statement] (noting that "the international terrorist threat to U.S. interests can be divided into
three categories: the radical international jihad movement, traditional, clearly defined terrorists
organizations, and state sponsors of international terrorism").
41. Current and Projected National Security Threats to the United States: Hearing Before
the Senate Select Comm. on Intelligence, 107th Cong. 92 (2002) (statement of Dale L. Watson,
Executive Assistant Director, Counterterrorism and Counterintelligence, Federal Bureau of
Investigation) [hereinafter Watson Statement] ("The transnational A1-Qaeda terrorist network
headed by Usama Bin Laden has clearly emerged as the most urgent threat to U.S. interests.").
But as government officials have cautioned:
[T]he threat from Al-Qaeda is only a part of the overall threat from the radical
international jihad movement, which is composed of individuals of varying
nationalities, ethnicities, tribes, races, and terrorist group memberships who work
together in support of extremist Sunni goals. One of the primary goals of Sunni
extremists is the removal of U.S. military forces from the Persian Gulf area, most
notably Saudi Arabia. The single common element among these diverse
individuals is their commitment to the radical international jihad movement, which
includes a radicalized ideology and agenda promoting the use of violence against
the "enemies of Islam" in order to overthrow all governments which are not ruled
by Sharia (conservative Islamic) law. A primary tactical objective of this
movement has been the planning and implementation of large-scale, high-profile,
high-casualty terrorist attacks against U.S. interests and citizens, and those of its
allies, worldwide.
Caruso II Statement, supra note 40, at 56; see also Watson Statement, supra, at 89; Ken
Guggenheim, Feds: Terror Group Members in U.S., ASSOCIATED PRESS ONLINE, Oct. 31,2002,
at 2002 WL 102133767 (reporting that the Department of Justice has advised the Senate
Intelligence Committee that "FBI investigations 'indicate the continued presence of suspected
extremists of various groups who could be called to attack in the United States"').
42. Hearings on the Intelligence Community's Response to Past Terrorist Attacks Against
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skilled, resourceful and deadly adversary that: (1) engages in long term
planning; (2) can conduct simultaneous operations; (3) is concerned with
operational security; (4) possesses a flexible command structure; and (5) is
creative in the methods it uses to achieve its goals.43 Over time, the
geographical emphasis of the war increasingly has expanded from
Afghanistan to "'ungoverned' areas of the Third World where al Qaeda and
its allies have regrouped for action or sought refuge."
44
Thirteen months after the September 11 attacks, and notwithstanding the
compelling show of military force by the United States, the Director of the
Central Intelligence Agency warned Congress: "They [(al Qaeda)] are
reconstituted. They are coming after us. They are planning in multi-
theaters. They are planning to strike the homeland again., 45 Two months
later, the United Nations issued a report stating that al Qaeda had reopened
training camps in remote regions of eastern Afghanistan and that it
the United States from February 1993 to September 2001, at 10 (2002) [hereinafter Response]
(statement of Eleanor Hill, Staff Director, Joint Inquiry Staff) (on file with author); Terrorist
Threats to the United States: Hearing Before the House Subcomm. on Immigration and Claims,
Comm. on the Judiciary, 106th Cong. 143 (2000) (statement of Ambassador Philip C. Wilcox,
Jr., Ambassador, U.S. State Dep't (Ret.)) ("[Tin recent years, ad hoc groups of terrorists,
sometimes loosely linked, and often claiming to act on behalf of Islam, have been the most
dynamic element in international terrorist attacks against the United States.").
43. Response, supra note 42, at 9-10; Caruso I Statement, supra note 40, at 161; see Neil
Doyle, Al Qaeda Nukes Are Reality, Intelligence Says, WASH. TIMES, Oct. 28, 2002, at Al
(reporting that there exists "a working assumption in security circles now that... [al Qaeda]
does have nuclear capabilities"); Thomas E. Ricks & Vernon Loeb, Afghan War Faltering,
Military Leader Says, WASH. POST, Nov. 8, 2002, at Al (reporting that analysis prepared by
U.S. Army War College indicated "that al Qaeda fighters have been quick to adapt to the highest
weaponry the United States used in its attack on the network").
44. Jim Hoagland, 3-Way War; Rumsfeld's Anti-Terrorism Balancing Act, WASH. POST,
Nov. 7,2002, at A25; see Teresa Cerojano, U.S. Warns al-Qaida Plotting Attacks, ASSOCIATED
PRESS ONLINE, Nov. 5, 2002, at 2002 WL 102135286 (reporting that U.S. official has warned
that al Qaeda "and its allies are looking for 'soft targets' for their next attack and are making
widescale efforts to establish a new base after being rooted out of Afghanistan").
45. Dana Priest & Susan Schmidt, Al Qaeda Threat Has Increased, Tenet Says, WASH.
POST, Oct. 18, 2002, at Al; see also Watson Statement, supra note 41, at 123 ("Even as the Al-
Qaeda command structure in Afghanistan is destroyed, A1-Qaeda cells in countries around the
world will continue to pose a threat to U.S. and other western interests."); Dana Priest &
DeNeen Brown, 'Sleeper Cell' Contacts Revealed by Canada, WASH. POST, Dec. 25, 2002, at
Al (reporting that "Al Qaeda 'sleeper cells' in Canada and the United States have
communicated with each other as recently as [December 2002], probably to plan terrorist attacks
in the United States"). Seven months earlier, CIA Director Tenet "warn[ed] Congress that
Osama bin Laden's terrorist network [had] not been destroyed and [was] working on plans for
new attacks against the United States." Walter Pincus, Tenet Says Al Qaeda Still Poses Threat,
WASH. POST, Feb. 7, 2002, at Al.
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continued to command a broad network of well-funded terrorists in forty
countries.46
Shortly after the attacks, many questioned whether those responsible
should be tried in civilian courts.47 The issue became more pressing as
Northern Alliance forces, backed by the United States, advanced across
Afghanistan pushing back the Taliban militia." As American military forces
engaged the enemy in this armed conflict, the government developed an
approach that employs both application of the criminal law49 and the law of
war.
50
46. Colum Lynch, Al Qaeda Is Reviving, U.N. Report Says, WASH. POST, Dec. 18, 2002,
at A27.
47. See, e.g., Karen DeYoung & Michael Dobbs, Bin Laden: Architect of New Global
Terrorism, WASH. POST, Sept. 16, 2001, at A8 (discussing in part how prosecution of terrorists
enables terrorist organization to learn how authorities investigate and pursue organization when
evidence related to those questions is presented in open court); William Glaberson, U.S. Faces
Tough Choices if Bin Laden Is Captured, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 22, 2001, at B5 (noting that trial of
Osama bin Laden in federal court "would present problems. Among other things, American
courts give defendants access to much of the government's evidence against them. A federal
court trial could provide terrorists with a road map to the country's intelligence sources ...
giving them an advantage in the continuing battle against terrorism."); John Lancaster & Susan
Schmidt, U.S. Rethinks Strategy for Coping with Terrorists, WASH. POST, Sept. 14,2001, at A9
("Stunned by the magnitude of [the September 11] terrorist attacks, Congress and the White
House are reassessing an approach to fighting terrorism that... has favored the tools of law
enforcement over those of war.").
48. See George Lardner Jr. & Peter Slevin, Military May Try Terrorism Cases, WASH.
POST, Nov. 14, 2001, at Al.
49. The campaign against terrorism will continue to have a significant criminal law
component. See David Johnston & Benjamin Weiser, Ashcroft Is Centralizing Control Over
the Prosecution and Prevention of Terrorism, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 10, 2001, at A9 (discussing
establishment of "9/11 Task Force" within the Department of Justice "to operate as the agency's
central command structure for prosecuting terror cases and helping to prevent further acts of
violence against the United States"); David Pace, FBI Referral Rate of Terror Cases for
Prosecution Grows, WASH. POST, June 17, 2002, at A5 (reporting that the "FBI has been
seeking prosecution of international terrorism cases at six times the rate it did before Sept. 11").
Illustrative of this point are the prosecutions of John Walker Lindh (the American citizen
apprehended in Afghanistan fighting for the Taliban, see supra note 12), Richard Reid (the shoe
bomber) and Zacarias Moussaoui (the only person charged with conspiring in the Sept. 11
attacks). See "I Am An Enemy of Your Country, WASH. POST, Oct. 5, 2002, at Al (reporting
Reid's criminal plea to attempting to blow up an airliner); Philip Shenon, U.S. Will Defy Court's
Order in Terror Case, N.Y. TIMES, July 15, 2003, at Al (reporting Moussaoui is "the only
person facing trial in the United States in connection with the attacks of Sept. 11, 2001").
50. See David Luban, The War on Terrorism and the End of Human Rights, 22 PHILOSOPHY
& PUBuC POL. Q. 9 (2002) (discussing the hybrid war-law approach); Note, supra note 19, at
1235 ("Insofar as the legal system does not guarantee [government's interests in punishment and
safety], we have rejected it in favor of the sword"). See generally Kenneth Anderson, What to
Do with Bin Laden and Al Qaeda Terrorists?: A Qualified Defense of Military Commissions
576
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol56/iss3/3
2003] ENEMY COMBATANTS, COURTS & THE CONSTITUTION 577
Some point out that by selectively mixing components of the criminal law
model and the war model,5 the administration has been "able to maximize
its own ability to mobilize legal force against terrorists while eliminating
most traditional rights of a military adversary, as well as the rights of
and United States Policy on Detainees at Guantanamo Bay Naval Base, 45 HARv. J.L. & PUB.
POL'Y 591, 611 (2002) (noting that "U.S. district courts are, by constitutional design, for
criminals and not for those who are at once criminals and enemies. U.S. district courts are
eminently unsuited by practicality but also by concept for the task of addressing those who
planned and executed September 1."); Spencer J. Crona & Neal A. Richardson, Justice for War
Criminals of Invisible Armies: A New Legal and Military Approach to Terrorism, 21 OKLA.
CITY U. L. REV. 349, 354 (1996) ("The strategy of treating terrorists as ordinary criminals, and
placing them into the slow and indifferent mill of our criminal justice system, for acts that far
transcend ordinary criminal acts, overlooks the essential difference in the nature of their
crimes."); Steve Chapman, Editorial, Different Rules Apply in Wartime, BALT. SUN, July 9,
2002, at 1 A (noting that the "Sept. 11 attacks were a crime, but they were far worse than that:
They were acts of war by a foreign enemy trying to coerce the U.S. government by killing
Americans. You don't fight Osama bin Laden and his lieutenants the way you fight John Gotti
or even Timothy McVeigh."). Illustrative of the government's use of the law of war is the
President's November 13th order. See supra note 35 and accompanying text; see also John P.
Elwood, Prosecuting the War on Terrorism: The Government's Position on Attorney-Client
Monitoring, Detainees, and Military Tribunals, CRIMINAL JUsTICE, Summer 2002, at 30, 34
(arguing that "[t]he trials of terrorists will represent more than an effort to discipline an errant
member of society for violating domestic law - it will also be an act of self-defense against an
external threat to our collective safety").
51. Professor Ruth Wedgewood articulates the rationale for the application of the war
model to terrorist acts perpetrated by organizations such al Qaeda as follows:
[T]here are terrorist organizations whose concerted design is to violently
disrupt and destroy existing governments and commerce. Against these, one may
have to entertain the paradigm of ongoing conflict. An idealist's desire to address
the root causes will not suffice against an organization that opposes all secular
regimes in the region or objects to United States protection of essential economic
and political interests. And simple reaction in the face of a completed attack will
often not be a wise or sufficient policy.
The defense of a nation-state in international war permits the targeting of the
adversary's command and control structure, military facilities, and even his
supporting economic assets. This is not a license to overrule good judgment. In
limited war, the rules of engagement are carefully moderated to avoid broadening
the conflict or drawing in other countries. While attending to third party interests
and maintaining the stability of the larger peace, one may need to place
antiterrorist actions within the international legal paradigm of war, rather than
unbroken peace, with a right of ongoing offensive action against an adversary's
paramilitary operations and network.
Ruth Wedgwood, Responding to Terrorism: The Strikes Against Bin Laden, 24 YALE J. INT'L
L. 559, 575-76 (1999); see also Crona & Richardson, supra note 50, at 357 ("Terrorism is not
a social problem susceptible to civilian intervention and law enforcement, but a military threat
and menace to our civilization appropriate for military repulsion.").
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innocent bystanders caught in the crossfire."" z  Others maintain that
America's engagement in Afghanistan is over,53 and that, therefore, we
should address its aftermath by adopting a law enforcement approach rather
than continuing to employ a "war [model] that operates for an indefinite
period of time, and is not ended even by the cessation of hostilities."54 The
reality is that both models will be used for some time to come. 5
52. Luban, supra note 50, at 10. Professor Luban presents the criticism against the hybrid
war-law model as follows:
Because the law model and war model come as conceptual packages, it is
unprincipled to wretch them apart and recombine them simply because it is in
America's interest to do so. To declare that Americans can fight enemies with the
latitude of warriors, but if the enemies fight back they are not warriors but
criminals, amount to a kind of heads-I-win-tails-you-lose international morality
in which whatever it takes to reduce American risk, no matter what the cost to
others, turns out to be justified.
Id. at 12-13.
53. This proposition is certainly debatable. See General Tommy Franks, Commander, U.S.
Central Command, Department of Defense News Briefing (Oct. 29, 2002), at
http://www.centcom.mil/CENTCOMNEWS/transcripts/20021029.htm ("[A] lot remains to be
done. It's not over. Very, very dangerous environment. Uneven environment. We see senses
of security and stability in some parts of Afghanistan, and we see ethnic and tribal issues in
other parts of Afghanistan, so we just have to keep working."); Michael Buettner, Detained
American's Appeal Heard, ASSOCIATED PRESS ONLINE, Oct. 28, 2002, available at 2002 WL
102132476 (reporting that government counsel in appeal involving Hamdi, which took place
more than one year after the attacks, indicated that "hostilities will continue 'certainly at least
for months and probably for years"'). Furthermore, the end of the military engagement in
Afghanistan does not mean the cessation of hostilities with al Qaeda. See Watson Statement,
supra note 41, at 123 ('Even as the Al-Qaeda command structure in Afghanistan is destroyed,
AI-Qaeda cells in countries around the world will continue to pose a threat to U.S. and other
western interests.").
54. Peter Spiro, The End of the "War" (and of War as We Know It): Deploying a Law
Enforcement Model in the Fight Against Terrorism, at http://writ.corporate.findlaw.com/
commentary/2002013 _spiro.html (Jan. 31,2002). See generally Eric M. Freedman, The Bush
Military Tribunals: Where Have We Been? Where Are We Going?, CRIM. JUST., Summer 2002,
at 14, 16 (arguing that "[i]f the government lacks confidence that its evidence is probative
enough to meet constitutional standards, it should not be prosecuting at all"); Editorial,
Liberty's Price, BALT. SUN, Aug. 9, 2002, at 10A ("Trying suspected traitors and terrorists in
federal court might entail some national security risks. But that's the price of liberty.").
55. As recognized by the American Bar Association's Task Force on Treatment of Enemy
Combatants:
The September 11 attacks were viewed as both crimes and acts of war, and the
United States has responded with both military operations and law enforcement
actions. Under the circumstances, legal doctrines and principles from both
domestic criminal procedure and international law, including the law of war, have
been applied. Because of the unique nature of the attacks and our responses to it,
it is not surprising that these doctrines and principles have been applied in new
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol56/iss3/3
20031 ENEMY COMBATANTS, COURTS & THE CONSTITUTION 579
When applying the war model, how should persons caught in the conflict
be treated? In general, the status of a person who is captured by the enemy
during an armed conflict will be ascertained by applying the four Geneva
Conventions of 1949.56 In the present conflict, and after a shift in position,
the administration declared that those who fought for Afghanistan's Taliban
regime and were captured were "enemy combatants," and thus would be
covered by the 1949 Geneva Conventions but not considered prisoners of
war.57 Members of al Qaeda's terrorist network, however, are not only not
ways and have, to some extent, overlapped.
ABA TASK FORCE ON TREATMENT OF ENEMY COMBATANTS, PRELIMINARY REPORT 7 (2002)
[hereinafter PRELIMINARY REPORT], available at http://www.abanet.org/poladv/congletters/
106th/enemycombatantreport.pdf; see Jennifer Elsea, Treatment of "Battlefield Detainees" in
the War on Terrorism, CRS REP. FOR CONGRESS, at CRS-44 (2002), available at http://fpc.
state.gov/documents/organization/9655.pdf (noting that given the application of elements based
on a conventional war model and a law enforcement model, "the role of Congress might be seen
as particularly important in providing a definition and a set of boundaries to shape how such a
war is to be fought"); Charles Lane, In Terror War, 2nd Track for Suspects, WASH. POST, Dec.
1, 2002, at Al (reporting that administration officials maintain a "parallel system is necessary
because terrorism is a form of war as well as a form of crime, and it must not only be punished
after incidents occur, but also prevented and disrupted through the gathering of timely
intelligence"); Jim Oliphant, Bush's Burden: Seeking Justice in Terror's Wake, LEGAL TIMES,
Sept. 17, 2001, at 12 ("Ultimately, it is likely that an extensive military campaign will exist side
by side with a domestic prosecutorial effort.").
56. Elsea, supra note 55, at CRS-7. By way of a synopsis:
The Geneva Conventions of 1949 create a comprehensive legal regime for the
treatment of detainees in an armed conflict. Members of a regular armed force and
certain others, including militias and volunteer corps serving as part of the armed
forces, are entitled to specific privileges as [prisoners of war]. Members of
volunteer corps, militias, and organized resistance forces that are not part of the
armed services of a party to the conflict are entitled to [prisoner of war] status if
the organization (a) is commanded by a person responsible for his subordinates,
(b) uses a fixed distinctive sign recognizable at a distance, (c) carries arms openly,
and (d) conducts its operations in accordance with the laws of war. Groups that
do not meet the standards are not entitled to [prisoner of war] status, and their
members who commit belligerent acts may be treated as civilians under the
Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of
War ....
Id. at CRS-3 (citations omitted).
57. See John Mintz & Mike Allen, Bush Shifts Position on Detainees, WASH. POST, Feb.
8, 2002, at Al; Michael C. Dorf, What Is an "Unlawful Combatant," and Why It Matters, at
http://writ.corporate.findlaw.com/dorf/20020123.html (Jan. 23, 2002) (noting that al Qaeda and
Taliban members need not be treated as prisoners of war because they do not satisfy criteria
governing irregular militias under Article IV of the Geneva Convention) [hereinafter Dorf,
Unlawful Combatant]. But see Mariner, supra note 8 (noting that under Article IV, "members
of the armed forces of parties to a conflict - i.e., forces such as the Taliban - are not assessed
under the four criteria cited by [the] Bush administration. Instead, all captured members of a
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considered prisoners of war, but also are not covered by the Geneva
Conventions because that network was not a party to the signed accords.5"
Furthermore, within the enemy combatant category, both Taliban and al
Qaeda prisoners are considered unlawful combatants.5 9 This means that they
are potentially subject to trial before military commissions, such as those
established by President Bush in his November 13th order, and not courts-
martial.60
As noted previously, noncitizen enemy combatants currently detained at
Guantanamo Bay by American military authorities, and American citizens
who have been identified as enemy combatants but are being held in the
United States, have challenged their detentions through petitions for writs
of habeas corpus. Before discussing the cases where the courts have
addressed the legal challenges raised by these detainees, it is instructive to
obtain a general overview of the history and operation of the writ of habeas
corpus.
IV. The Writ of Habeas Corpus
The "grand purpose" of the writ of habeas corpus is to protect
"individuals against the erosion of their right to be free from wrongful
restraints upon their liberty.' Of ancient origin,62 the writ "has for
party's armed forces automatically enjoy POW status.").
58. See Elsea, supra note 55, at CRS-5; Mintz & Allen, supra note 57, at Al; see also
Diane F. Orentlicher & Robert Kogod Goldman, When Justice Goes to War: Prosecuting
Terrorists Before Military Commissions, 25 HARv. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 653,658 (2002) (noting
that "[i]n the context of the armed conflict in Afghanistan, the United States could treat Al
Qaeda as a paramilitary organization and its members as unprivileged combatants who do not
observe the basic rules of warfare as required by Article 4A(2) of the Third Geneva Convention
of 1949") (citation omitted).
59. See United States v. Lindh, 212 F. Supp. 2d 541, 554-55 (E.D. Va. 2002) (discussing
Taliban militia); Dorf, Unlawful Combatant, supra note 57 (noting that "[a]ccording to Defense
Secretary Rumsfeld, the Taliban and al Qaeda fighters currently being held captive at the United
States Naval Base at Guantanarno Bay, Cuba, are not prisoners of war, but 'unlawful
combatants"').
60. See Geraghty, supra note 26, at 583 (noting that al Qaeda operatives who executed
September 11 attacks, "if captured... would not be entitled to prisoner of war status and could be
tried and sentenced within a military tribunal that applies the law of war") (footnote omitted); Doff,
Unlawful Combatant, supra note 57; Michael C. Doff, Who Decides Whether YaserHamdi orAny
Other Citizen, Is an Enemy Combatant, at http://writ.corporate.findlaw.com/dorf/20020821 .html
(Aug. 21, 2002).
61. Jones v. Cunningham, 371 U.S. 236, 243 (1963); see Harris v. Nelson, 394 U.S. 286,
290-91 (1969) ("The writ of habeas corpus is the fundamental instrument for safeguarding
individual freedom against arbitrary and lawless state action.").
62. 17A CHARLES A. WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE § 4261, at 270
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centuries been esteemed the best and only sufficient defense of personal
freedom. '6 3 It was initially recognized in the federal system under the
Judiciary Act of 1789, when the first Congress granted federal courts the
"power to issue writs of... habeas corpus" to prisoners "in custody, under
or by colour of the authority of the United States."'  State judgments,
however, were not subject to federal habeas corpus review.65
In 1833, Congress expanded the power of the federal courts by granting
them the authority to issue writs "in all cases of a prisoner.., in jail... by
any authority or law, for any act done ... in pursuance of a law of the United
States. 66 In 1842, Congress extended jurisdiction to citizens of foreign
countries held in custody for acts performed under the authority of their
countries' laws. 67 Then, after the U.S. Civil War, Congress amended the
federal habeas corpus statute, authorizing federal courts to issue the writ if
the detention was at the hands of state authorities, in the case of a violation
of the U.S. laws or Constitution, and also, as discussed below, by adding a
jurisdictional limitation.68 Additionally, Congress expanded the scope of
judicial review, allowing a petitioner the right to "deny any of the material
(1988) ("The writ of habeas corpus, providing a means by which the legal authority under which
a person is detained can be challenged, is of immemorial antiquity."); see Issues Cognizable:
Developments in the Law - Federal Habeas Corpus, 83 HARV. L. REV. 1042, 1042 (1970)
[hereinafter Issues Cognizable] (recognizing that while "It]he precise origin of the writ of
habeas corpus is not certain... as early as 1220 A.D. the words habeat corpora are to be found
in an order directing an English sheriff to produce parties to a trespass action before the Court
of Common Pleas") (citation omitted).
63. Ex Parte Rosier, 133 F.2d 316,323 (D.C. Cir. 1942), overruled by Dorsey v. Gill, 148
F.2d 857, 863 (D.C. Cir. 1945).
64. Act of Sept. 24, 1789, ch. 20, § 14, 1 Stat. 73, 81-82; see Carbo v. United States, 364
U.S. 611,614 (1961).
65. See Charles Graddick, Debunking the Ancient Writ: A Critical Analysis of the Law of
Habeas Corpus, 14 CUMB. L. REV. 1, 6-7 (1984).
66. Act of Mar. 2, 1833, ch. 57, § 7,4 Stat. 632,634; see also Carbo, 364 U.S. at 615 n.6.
It has been argued that "[blecause the section comprised part of the 'Force Act,' enacted to deal
with South Carolina's attempted nullification of [a] tariff, it clearly was intended to apply to
state confinement." Lewis Mayers, The Habeas Corpus Act of 1867: The Supreme Court as
Legal Historian, 33 U. CHI. L. REV. 31, 33 n.10 (1965); accord Graddick, supra note 65, at 7
(noting that the extension of authority "was the result of Congress' efforts to release United
States officers, who were arrested and imprisoned in South Carolina for violating the
nullification laws of the state for performing their duties in collecting federal revenue").
67. Act of Aug. 29, 1842, ch. 257, 5 Stat. 539; see also Carbo, 364 U.S. at 615 n.6.
68. Act of Feb. 5, 1867, ch. 28, § 1, 14 Stat. 385, 385-86; see also Carbo, 364 U.S. at 615
n.6. As pointed out by the Court in Carbo, the extension of jurisdiction in 1842 "imposed a
jurisdictional limitation upon [the writ's] issuance - power to grant applications by foreign
citizens was given only to Justices of the Supreme Court, and to judges of the District Court in
the district of confinement." Id. at 616 n. 10.
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facts set forth in the return or ... allege any fact to show that the detention
[was] in contravention of the constitution or laws of the United States. 69
The current statutory authority, "implement[ing] the constitutional
command7" that the writ of habeas corpus be made available"'" is found at
28 U.S.C. §§ 2241 to 2255. In pertinent part, § 2241(a) provides that
"[w]rits of habeas corpus may be granted by the Supreme Court, any justice
thereof, the district courts and any circuit judge within their respective
jurisdictions. 72 This jurisdictional limitation was placed in the statute
because "it was thought inconvenient, potentially embarrassing, certainly
expensive and on the whole quite unnecessary to provide every judge
anywhere with authority to issue the Great Writ on behalf of applicants far
distantly removed from the courts whereon they sat."73
An application for a writ of habeas corpus must be signed and verified by
the detained person "or by someone acting in his behalf."74 Upon receipt of
such application, the court orjudge entertaining it must "forthwith award the
writ or issue an order directing the respondent to show cause why the writ
69. § 1, 14 Stat. at 386; see also Carbo, 364 U.S. at 614-22 (discussing the history of
congressional delegation of the power to issue writs of habeas corpus to courts).
70. The Constitution provides that "[t]he Privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus shall not
be suspended, unless when in Cases of Rebellion or Invasion the public Safety may require it."
U.S. CONST. art I, § 9, cl. 2; see also Issues Cognizable, supra note 62, at 1263-74 (discussing
suspension clause, which it describes as "simple in appearance, [but] fraught with confusion").
71. Jones v. Cunningham, 371 U.S. 236, 238 (1963).
72. 28 U.S.C. § 2241(a) (2000); see Morgan v. United States, 380 F.2d 686,693 (9th Cir.
1967) (noting that in Carbo, the Supreme Court recognized that "habeas corpus is a generic
term, embracing both habeas corpus ad subjiciendum (to inquire into the cause of the restraint)
and habeas corpus ad prosequendum (to bring the prisoner to trial)"). Under the statute, a writ
is not available to a prisoner unless:
(1) He is in custody under or by color of the authority of the United States or
is committed for trial before some court thereof; or
(2) He is in custody for an act done or omitted in pursuance of an Act of
Congress, or an order, process, judgment or decree of a court or judge of the
United States; or
(3) He is in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the
United States; or
(4) He, being a citizen of a foreign state and domiciled therein is in custody for
an act done or omitted under any alleged right, title, authority, privilege,
protection, or exemption claimed under the commission, order or sanction of any
foreign state, or under color thereof, the validity and effect of which depend upon
the law of nations; or
(5) It is necessary to bring him into court to testify or for trial.
28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(l)-(5).
73. Carbo, 364 U.S. at 617.
74. 28 U.S.C. § 2242.
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol56/iss3/3
2003] ENEMY COMBATANTS, COURTS & THE CONSTITUTION 583
should not be granted, unless it appears from the application that the
applicant or person is not entitled thereto."" The writ or order to show
cause must "be directed to the person having custody of the person
detained"76 who must "certify[] the true cause of the detention."77 A hearing
must be set when the writ or order is returned 8 and unless only legal issues
are presented in the application or return, "the person to whom the writ is
directed shall be required to produce at the hearing the body of the person
detained."79 Finally, the court must "summarily hear and determine the
facts, and dispose of the matter as law and justice require."' 0
V. Case Precedent
The U.S. Supreme Court and lower courts have addressed whether the
writ, in times of war, should be available to citizens and aliens challenging
their detentions. The cases discussed below address two pertinent issues.
The first - particularly relevant to the petitions filed by the detainees in
Guantanamo - concerns the jurisdiction of a federal district court to issue
a writ of habeas corpus. The second pertains to the scope of judicial review
of petitions for writs of habeas corpus filed by those captured in the course
of armed conflict, and also, the designation of American citizens as enemy
combatants.
75. Id. § 2243.
76. Id; see also Braden v. 30th Judicial Circuit Court, 410 U.S. 484,494-95 (1973) ("The
writ of habeas corpus does not act upon the prisoner who seeks relief, but upon the person who
holds him in what is alleged to be unlawful custody."); Schlanger v. Seamans, 401 U.S. 487,
491 (1971) (noting that the absence of a custodian within the territorial jurisdiction of the
district court "is fatal to the jurisdiction").
77. 28 U.S.C. § 2243.
78. This hearing should be set "not more than five days after the return unless for good
cause additional time is allowed." Id. The person being detained or the applicant "may, under
oath, deny any of the facts set forth in the return or allege any other material facts." Id. Further,
28 U.S.C. § 2246 provides for the taking of evidence by way of interrogatories, affidavits, or
depositions. Id.§ 2246.
79. Id. § 2243.
80. Id. The critical role of the judiciary in ruling on petitions for a writ of habeas corpus
was summarized by the Court in Harris v. Nelson, 394 U.S. 286 (1969), as follows:
There is no higher duty of a court, under our constitutional system, than the
careful processing and adjudication of petitions for writs of habeas corpus, for it
is in such proceedings that a person in custody charges that error, neglect, or evil
purpose has resulted in his unlawful confinement and that he is deprived of his
freedom contrary to law.
Id. at 292.
Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2003
OKLAHOMA LAW REVIEW
A. Jurisdiction
In Johnson v. Eisentrager,l a military commission convicted twenty-one
German nationals under the laws of war for hostile operations against the
United States after Germany's unconditional surrender, but before Japan's
surrender.8 2 The military commission sat in China, and after the convictions
were reviewed and approved by the military authorities, the prisoners were
repatriated to Germany to serve their sentences.
In their petition for habeas corpus, the prisoners alleged that their
convictions and subsequent imprisonment were obtained in violation of
Articles I and Hm of the Constitution, the Fifth Amendment, and "other
provisions of the Constitution and laws of the United States and provisions
of the Geneva Convention governing treatment of prisoners of war."" The
district court dismissed the petition for want of jurisdiction.85 The United
States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit remanded the
case for further proceedings,86 and the Supreme Court reversed. 7
Framing the "ultimate question" as one involving the "jurisdiction of civil
courts of the United States vis-4-vis military authorities in dealing with
enemy aliens overseas,"88 the Court first reviewed the rights and differences
between citizen resident and nonresident aliens in times of war. 9 The Court
then postulated that to invest "enemy aliens, resident, captured and
imprisoned abroad, with standing to demand access to our courts,"' it would
have to hold that
81. 339 U.S. 763 (1950).
82. Id. at 765-66. The "hostile operations consisted principally of collecting and furnishing
intelligence concerning American forces and their movements to the Japanese armed forces."
Id. at 766.
83. Id.
84. Id. at 767.
85. Eisentrager v. Forrestal, 174 F. 2d 961,962 (D.C. Cir. 1949), rev'd sub nom. Johnson
v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763 (1950).
86. Id. The court of appeals ruled that "any person who [was] deprived of his liberty by
officials of the United States, acting under purported authority of that Government, and who
[could] show that his confinement [was] in violation of a prohibition of the Constitution, [had]
a right to the writ." Id. at 963. It remanded the case to the district court for a determination of
which of the respondents had "directive power, by line of authority, over the jailer of [the]
appellants." Id. at 968. Those that did not possess such power were to be dismissed from the
case. Id.
87. Johnson, 339 U.S. at 791.
88. Id. at 765.
89. Id. at 768-77.
90. Id. at 777.
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a prisoner of our military authorities is constitutionally entitled
to the writ, even though he (a) [was] an enemy alien; (b) [had]
never been or resided in the United States; (c) was captured
outside of our territory and there held in military custody as a
prisoner of war; (d) was tried and convicted by a Military
Commission sitting outside the United States; (e) for offenses
against laws of war committed outside the United States; (f) and
[was] at all times imprisoned outside the United States.9"
The Court declined to so hold.
The Court reasoned that the presence of an alien in the United States,
whether enemy or friendly, "implied protection" and that no such protection
could be invoked under the circumstances presented because the "prisoners
at no relevant time were within any territory over which the United States
[was] sovereign and the scenes of their offense, their capture, their trial and
their punishment were all beyond the territorial jurisdiction of any court of
the United States."92 The Court also recognized that "[e]xecutive power
over enemy aliens, undelayed and unhampered by litigation ha[d] been
deemed, throughout our history, essential to war-time security. ' 93 That
security, the Court noted, would be jeopardized if field commanders were
called to account for their actions by their enemies in their own civil courts,
thereby diverting their attention from their military mission. 94
B. Scope of Judicial Review and Designation of American Citizens as
Combatants
In Ex Parte Quirin,9" petitioners, eight German saboteurs, surreptitiously
entered the United States after disembarking from two submarines off the
91. Id.
92. Id. at 777-78.
93. Id. at 774.
94. Id. at 779. In that vein, the Court observed that such enemy driven litigation would
likely result in conflicts of opinion between the military and the judiciary. Id. The Court also
rejected petitioners' argument that its prior rulings in ExParte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1 (1942), and
In re Yamashita, 327 U.S. 1 (1945), both of which are discussed in the text below, supported
the contention that a writ of habeas corpus was legally available to challenge the detentions.
Johnson, 339 U.S. at 779-80. It distinguished Quirin on the grounds that the petitioners in that
case were in custody in the District of Columbia. Id. at 779. As to Yamashita, the Court
pointed out that by reason of the United States' sovereignty over the Philippines, the petitioner
in that case not only committed offenses within U.S. territory, he had also been tried in U.S.
insular courts and imprisoned in U.S. territory. Id. at 780. None of those bases ofjurisdiction,
the Court determined, could be invoked by the Johnson petitioners. Id.
95. 317 U.S. 1 (1942).
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Atlantic coast.96 One of the saboteurs, Herbert Haupt, arguably was an
American citizen.97 After burying their uniforms and supplies of explosives,
fuses, and incendiary devices, they proceeded in civilian dress to
Jacksonville, Florida, and New York City with instructions to destroy war
facilities and industries.9" Subsequently, the FBI apprehended all eight
saboteurs in New York and Chicago."
President Franklin Roosevelt "appointed a military commission and
directed it to try petitioners for offenses against the law of war and the
Articles of War." " The FBI turned them over to the Provost Marshal of the
Military District of Washington for trial before the commission.'
Thereafter, petitioners challenged the legality of their detentions in
applications for writs of habeas corpus on the grounds that the President
lacked both constitutional and statutory authority to order trial before a
military tribunal rather than a civilian court. 2 The Court rejected
petitioners' arguments.0 3
The Court began its analysis by noting that the writs did not raise the
issue of guilt or innocence, but rather, the military commission's lawful
authority to try petitioners. 4 It then rejected the government's arguments
that (1) because petitioners were either enemy aliens or belligerents, and (2)
because the President's proclamation establishing a military commission to
try them undertook to deny judicial access to such persons, the Court should
decline any review.0 5 The Court reasoned that nothing in the proclamation
96. Id. at 20-21.
97. Id. at 20. While Haupt maintained that he was a citizen "by virtue of the naturalization
of his parents during his minority," the government argued that by his conduct, Haupt
denounced and abandoned his citizenship. Id. The Court declined to address this dispute
because its resolution of this question was immaterial to the ultimate ruling. Id.
98. Id. at 21.
99. Id.
100. Id. at 22.
101. Id. at 23.
102. Id. at 24.
103. Id. at 48.
104. Id. at 25.
105. Id. The same day that President Roosevelt issued the order directing that a military
commission try the petitioners, he issued a Proclamation declaring that
all persons who are subjects, citizens or residents of any nation at war with the
United States or who give obedience to or act under the direction of any such
nation, and who during time of war enter or attempt to enter the United States...
through coastal or boundary defenses, and are charged with committing or
attempting or preparing to commit sabotage, espionage, hostile or warlike acts, or
violations of the law of war, shall be subject to the law of war and to the
jurisdiction of military tribunals.
Id. at 22-23 (quoting Proclamation 2561, 7 Fed. Reg. 5101 (July 2, 1942)). The Proclamation
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supported a construction "preclud[ing] access to the courts for determining
its applicability to [a] particular case."' 06 Furthermore, the Court determined
that neither the petitioners' status nor the proclamation "foreclosed
consideration by the courts of petitioners' contentions that the Constitution
and laws of the United States constitutionally enacted forbid their trial by
military commission." °7
The Court then found that the President, with the support of Congress,
had the power to establish military tribunals to prosecute offenses against
the laws of war, and that he had appropriately exercised that power in
Quirin.0 8 As to whether petitioners fell within the category of persons
triable before military tribunals, the Court noted the distinction between
lawful and unlawful combatants and how, in the case of unlawful
combatants, they were "subject to capture and detention, but in addition...
trial and punishment by military tribunals for acts which render[ed] their
belligerency unlawful. ' ' 1"9 Having drawn the distinction, the Court
determined that petitioners' conduct constituted unlawful belligerency." 0
As to Haupt's contention that his American citizenship insulated him
from the consequences of his unlawful belligerency, the Court ruled:
Citizenship in the United States of an enemy belligerent does not
relieve him from the consequences of a belligerency which is
unlawful because in violation of the law of war. Citizens who
further stated that those affected would not have access to the courts. Id. at 23.
106. Id. at 25.
107. Id.; see Orentlicher & Goldman, supra note 58, at 659 (noting that the Court in Quirin
"had no trouble concluding that the saboteurs could have recourse to federal court to challenge
the lawfulness of their prosecution before a military commission").
108. Quirin, 317 U.S. at 26-30. The Court considered it unnecessary "to determine to what
extent the President as Commander in Chief has constitutional power to create military
commissions without the support of Congressional legislation. For here Congress [had]
authorized trial of offenses against the law of war before such commissions." Id. at 29.
109. Id. at 31. As the Court explained:
The spy who secretly and without uniform passes the military lines of a belligerent
in time of war, seeking to gather military information and communicate it to the
enemy, or an enemy combatant who without uniform comes secretly through the
lines for the purpose of waging war by destruction of life or property, are familiar
examples of belligerents who are generally deemed not to be entitled to the status
of prisoners of war, but to be offenders against the law of war subject to trial and
punishment by military tribunals.
Id; see also id. at 35 (recognizing that "those who during time of war pass surreptitiously from
enemy territory into our own, discarding their uniforms upon entry, for the commission of
hostile acts involving destruction of life or property, have the status of unlawful combatants
punishable as such by military commission").
110. Id. at 36-39.
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associate themselves with the military arm of the enemy
government, and with its aid, guidance and direction enter this
country bent on hostile acts, are enemy belligerents within the
meaning of the Hague Convention and the law of war."'
Put another way, Haupt was charged with entering the United States as an
enemy belligerent and "unlawful belligerency [was] the gravamen of the
offense of which he [was] accused.""' 2
A similar case from the period discussing the treatment of American
citizens in wartime is In re Territo.113 American armed forces captured
Gaetano Territo, a soldier in the Italian Army, on the field of battle. " 4 The
military held him as a prisoner of war in Italy and then transferred him to the
United States." '5 After arriving, Territo, who had been born in West
Virginia, filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus, alleging that his
restraint was unlawful because he had been born in the United States and at
all times had remained a citizen. "6 The district court ruled that his detention
was lawful and the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
affirmed. "7
In rejecting the petitioner's contention that his citizenship rendered
classification as a prisoner of war improper, the court of appeals found no
support in precedent for the proposition "that citizenship in the country of
either army in collision necessarily affect[ed] the status of one captured on
the field of battle."" 8 The court explained that the object of capture was to
prevent the person who was apprehended from assisting the enemy, an end
which was accomplished by removing that person from the field of battle,
111. Id. at 37-38; see Mudd v. Caldera, 134 F. Supp. 2d 138, 145-46 (D.D.C. 2001)
(recognizing that "[u]nder Quirin, citizens and non-citizens alike - whether or not members
of the military, or under its direction or control, may be subject to the jurisdiction of a military
commission for violations of the law of war").
112. Quirin, 317 U.S. at 38. With respect to Haupt's argument that under Ex Parte Milligan,
71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 2 (1866), he was not subject to prosecution before a military tribunal because
the civil courts were open, the Court distinguished Milligan on the ground that the petitioner
there was not an enemy belligerent. Quirin, 317 U.S. at 45.
113. 156 F.2d 142 (9th Cir. 1946).
114. Id. at 143.
115. Id.
116. Id. at 142. The petition was filed "[tihrough the interposition of Frances Territo Di
Maria." Id.
117. Id. at 144, 148.
118. Id. at 145; see Colepaugh v. Looney, 235 F.2d 429, 432 (10th Cir. 1956) ("[T]he
petitioner's citizenship in the United States does not.., confer upon him any constitutional
rights not accorded any other belligerent under the laws of war.").
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treating him humanely, and at some point repatriating or releasing him." 9
Regarding the scope of judicial review of a petition for a writ of habeas
corpus in the war context, the U.S. Supreme Court's ruling in In re
Yamashita120 is instructive.' 2' There, General Tomoyuki Yamashita, the
Commanding General of the Fourteenth Army Group of the Imperial
Japanese Army in the Philippine Islands, was charged with violations of the
laws of war by permitting troops under his command to commit high crimes
and brutal atrocities against Americans and their allies.122  A military
commission tried and convicted General Yamashita of violations of the laws
of war and sentenced him to death by hanging.'23
In petitions for habeas corpus, General Yamashita raised various
challenges to the authority and jurisdiction of the military commission to try
him for violations of the laws of war. 24 Before rejecting these challenges,
the Court generally identified three "governing principles" relating to the
scope of its review.12 First, the Court noted that the issue on habeas corpus
was not guilt or innocence, but "only the lawful power of the commission to
try the petitioner for the offense charged."' 26 Second, the Court observed
119. Territo, 156 F.2d at 145. While Quirin and Territo certainly are relevant to the
question of the executive's authority to designate American citizens as enemy combatants, it has
been pointed out that
Quirin and Territo arose in World War I. Little question existed about who the
enemy was or whether the Quirin defendants or Territo were members of the
enemy armed forces. Thus, these decisions turned not on whether the detainees
were enemy combatants, but on whether enemy combatants - even if U.S.
citizens - could be detained and tried by the military. In the current situation,
these lines are less clear, both in general and in application in specific cases.
PRELIMINARY REPORT, supra note 55, at 10.
120. 327 U.S. 1 (1945).
121. See id. at 25-26.
122. Id. at 14.
123. Id. at 5.
124. Id. at 6.
125. Id. at 9.
126. Id. at 8. Specifically, addressing military commissions or tribunals, the Court held:
[I]t must be recognized throughout that the military tribunals which Congress has
sanctioned by the Articles of War are not courts whose rulings and judgments are
made subject to review by this Court. They are tribunals whose determinations are
reviewable by the military authorities either as provided in the military orders
constituting such tribunals or as provided by the Articles of War. Congress
conferred on the courts no power to review their determinations save only as it has
granted judicial power "to grant writs of habeas corpus for the purpose of an
inquiry into the cause of the restraint of liberty." The courts may inquire whether
the detention complained of is within the authority of those detaining the
petitioner. If the military tribunals have lawful authority to hear, decide and
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that Congress' sanction of the trial of enemy aliens before military tribunals
did not "foreclose[] their right to contend that the Constitution or laws of the
United States withh[e]ld [the government's] authority to proceed with the
trial."' 27 Finally, Congress had not taken back, "and the Executive branch
of the Government could not, unless there was suspension of the writ,
withdraw from the courts the duty and power to make such inquiry into the
authority of the commission as may be made by habeas corpus." '128
VI. The Challenges by the Guantanamo Bay Detainees
As previously noted, some of the detainees held at the naval base in
Guantanamo filed petitions for writs of habeas corpus in federal court,
challenging the authority of the government to hold them without charges
and deny them the right of access to lawyers.' These cases are now
examined.
A. Coalition of Clergy v. Bush
In Coalition of Clergy v. Bush," petitioners, a group including ten
lawyers, three rabbis, a Christian pastor, and several journalists, filed a
petition for a writ of habeas corpus in the United States District Court for the
Central District of California on behalf of all captives held in
Guantanamo. ' The petition alleged that the government held the prisoners
in violation of both the Constitution and the laws and treaties of the United
States because the government: (1) failed to inform them of the nature of the
accusations against them; (2) denied them the right to the assistance of
condemn, their action is not subject to judicial review merely because they have
made a wrong decision on disputed facts. Correction of their errors of decision
is not for the courts but for the military authorities which are alone authorized to
review their decisions.
Id. (citations omitted) (quoting 28 U.S.C. §§ 451,452 (1934)).
127. Id. at 9.
128. Id; see Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763, 775 (1950) (limiting review "only to
ascertain the existence of a state of war and whether [petitioner] is an alien enemy and so subject
to the Alien Enemy Act. Once these jurisdictional elements have been determined, courts will
not inquire into any other issue as to his internment.").
129. See Rasul v. Bush, 215 F. Supp. 2d 55 (D.D.C. 2002), affd sub. nom. Al Odah v.
United States, 321 F.3d 1134 (D.C. Cir. 2003), and cert. granted, 124 S. Ct. 534 (2003);
Coalition of Clergy v. Bush, 189 F. Supp. 2d 1036 (C.D. Cal. 2002), affd in part, vacated in
part, 310 F.3d 1153 (9th Cir. 2002), and cert. denied, 123 S. Ct. 2073 (2003) (mer.) (Coalition
of Clergy I).
130. 189 F. Supp. 2d 1036 (C.D. Cal. 2002), aff'd in part, vacated in part, 310 F.3d 1153
(9th Cir. 2002), and cert. denied, 123 S. Ct. 2073 (2003) (mer.) (Coalition of Clergy 1).
131. Id. at 1037.
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counsel; and (3) deprived them of their liberty without due process of law.
32
The respondents, including President Bush and Secretary of Defense Donald
H. Rumsfeld, '33 argued that petitioners lacked standing to bring the petition
but even if they could, no federal court had jurisdiction to entertain it.
134
The district court agreed.
35
First, the court found that petitioners lacked standing to assert any claims
on behalf of the detainees. 36 The court determined that under the governing
Ninth Circuit test for "next friend" standing,'37 petitioners lacked the
required relationship with the detainees to bring the cause of action.
138
Recognizing that petitioners might attempt to remedy this problem by
seeking leave to file an amended petition buttressing the standing question,
the court ruled that such a request would be denied because an amended
petition could not satisfy the writ's jurisdictional requirements. 
31
The court initially noted that because none of the named respondents was
found within its district, it lacked jurisdiction to issue the writ. 40 The court
recognized, however, that jurisdiction could lie in a district court where
anyone in the "chain of command" with control over the prisoners was
present and that at least some of the respondents identified in the petition
were present within the jurisdiction of the United States District Court for
the District of Columbia.14' Accordingly, the court went on to consider
132. Id. at 1038.
133. Additional respondents included "Richard B. Myers, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs
of Staff; Gordon R. England, the Secretary of [the] Navy; and five other named individuals and
'1000 Unknown Named United States Military Personnel,' all of whom [were] alleged to be
military officers responsible for the operations at the Guantanamo Naval Base." Id.
134. Id. at 1039-40.
135. Id. at 1039.
136. Id. at 1040-44.
137. As previously noted, 28 U.S.C. § 2242 provides that an "[aipplication for a writ of
habeas corpus shall be in writing signed and verified by the person for whose relief it is intended
or by someone acting in his behalf." 28 U.S.C. § 2242 (2000) (emphasis added); see supra text
accompanying note 74. Applying the test set forth by the Supreme Court in Whitmore v.
Arkansas, 495 U.S. 149 (1990), the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit ruled
in Massie ex rel. Kroll v. Woodford, 244 F.3d 1192 (9th Cir. 2001), that
[i]n order to establish next friend standing, the putative next friend must show: (1)
that the petitioner is unable to litigate his own cause due to mental incapacity, lack
of access to court, or other similar disability; and (2) the next friend has some
significant relationship with, and is truly dedicated to the bests interests of, the
petitioner.
Massie, 244 F.3d at 1194.
138. Coalition of Clergy , 189 F. Supp. 2d at 1045.
139. Id. at 1044.
140. Id. at 1045.
141. Id.
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whether a transfer of the petition to that district court under 28 U.S.C. §
16314 would be appropriate and concluded that such was not the case
because that district court likewise lacked jurisdiction.'
In reaching its conclusion, the court relied on Johnson, finding it
controlling.' The court found no meaningful distinction between the
petitioners in Johnson and the detainees in Guantanamo because both were
aliens, had been captured abroad in combat, were identified as enemy
combatants, were held under the exclusive control of the military, and had
never set foot on American soil. 4 ' The court then turned to the remaining
question of whether the detainees were "present" in the United States by
virtue of their detention at the Guantanamo Naval Base.'"
The court began its analysis by noting that "there [was] a difference
between territorial jurisdiction and sovereignty, and it [was] the latter
concept that [was] key."'4 7 To ascertain whether the United States exercised
jurisdiction or sovereignty over the naval base, the court examined the lease
agreement entered into by both countries in 1903.' The court found Article
I of the agreement particularly illuminating on the question of sovereignty.
It stated:
While on the one hand the United States recognizes the
continuance of the ultimate sovereignty of the Republic of Cuba
over the above described areas of land and water, on the other
hand the Republic of Cuba consents that during the period of
occupation by the United States of said areas under the terms of
this agreement the United States shall exercise complete
jurisdiction and control over and within said areas. 4 9
142. 28 U.S.C. § 1631 provides in relevant part:
Whenever a civil action is filed in a court... and that court finds that there is a
want of jurisdiction, the court shall, if it is in the interest of justice, transfer such
action ... to any other such court in which the action... could have been brought
at the time it was filed ....
28 U.S.C. § 1631 (2000).
143. Coalition of Clergy , 189 F. Supp. 2d at 1046-50.
144. Id. at 1046.
145. Id. at 1048.
146. Id.
147. Id. at 1049.
148. Id.; see Agreement on Lease of Land for Coaling and Naval Stations, Feb. 16-23, 1903,
U.S.-Cuba, T.S. No. 418 [hereinafter U.S.-Cuba Lease]. A subsequent treaty between the
United States and Cuba provides that the lease shall "continue in effect" until the parties elect
to abrogate or modify it. Treaty Between United States of America and Cuba Defining Their
Relations, May 29, 1934, art. I1, 48 Stat. 1682, 1683.
149. U.S.-Cuba Lease, supra note 148, art. m1, T.S. No. 418 (quoted in Coalition of Clergy
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Concluding that it lacked the authority to ignore the parties' distinction
between jurisdiction and sovereignty, the court rejected petitioners'
contention that the concepts were interchangeable. 50 Moreover, the court
found that in analogous contexts, other federal courts had held that the naval
base at Guantanamo Bay was outside the sovereign territory of the United
States, and thus not the functional equivalent of U.S. territory. 5' Finding
that Cuba retained sovereignty over the naval base, the court applied
Johnson and ruled that petitioners were not entitled to a writ of habeas
corpus. '52
On appeal, the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's ruling that
petitioners lacked standing to file suit on behalf of the detainees as next
friends. '53 The court of appeals also vacated the portion of the ruling below
addressing the absence of federal jurisdiction under Johnson.' 
54
B. Rasul v. Bush
The United States District Court for the District of Columbia also has
confronted a legal challenge to the detentions at the naval base in
Guantanamo. In Rasul v. Bush,'55 two British citizens, an Australian citizen,
and certain of their parents filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus
requesting access to counsel, the cessation of interrogations while litigation
1, 189 F. Supp. 2d at 1049).
150. Coalition of Clergy , 189 F. Supp. 2d at 1049; see Vermilya-Brown Co. v. Connell,
335 U.S. 377,380 (1948) ("IT]he determination of sovereignty over an area is for the legislative
and executive departments ... ").
151. Coalition of Clergy 1, 189 F. Supp. 2d at 1049-50; see Cuban Am. Bar Ass'n v.
Christopher, 43 F. 3d 1412, 1425 (11th Cir. 1995); Bird v. United States, 923 F. Supp. 338,
342-43 (D. Conn. 1996).
152. Coalition of Clergy 1, 189 F. Supp. 2d at 1050.
153. See Coalition of Clergy v. Bush, 310 F.3d 1153, 1156 (9th Cir. 2002) (Coalition of
Clergy HI).
154. Id. at 1164. The Ninth Circuit criticized the portion of the district court's ruling
addressing the question of jurisdiction because the Coalition lacked standing to bring the
petition in the first place. Id. The court pointed out that
[t]he Supreme Court has stated that federal courts must hesitate before resolving
a controversy, even one within their constitutional power to resolve, on the basis
of the rights of third persons not parties to the litigation. Such a concern cuts to
the heart of the case-and-controversy requirement of Article IH. Courts should not
adjudicate rights unnecessarily; the real parties in interest in an adversarial system
are usually the best proponents of their own rights.
Id. (citation omitted).
155. 215 F. Supp. 2d 55 (D.D.C. 2002), affd sub. nom. Al Odah v. United States, 321 F.3d
1134 (D.C. Cir. 2003), and cert. granted, 124 S. Ct. 534 (2003).
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was pending, and their release. 56 In a companion case, also assigned to the
court because of the similarity of the issues presented, twelve Kuwaiti
nationals and members of their families brought an action seeking
preliminary and permanent injunctive relief, requesting that they be advised
of the charges against them and be granted access to their families, legal
counsel, and the courts or other impartial tribunal.'57 The Kuwaiti plaintiffs
alleged that the defendants' conduct deprived them of due process under the
Fifth Amendment and violated their rights under the Alien Tort Claims Act
and the Administrative Procedure Act.5 8 In both cases, the U.S. government
moved for dismissal on jurisdictional grounds.'59
The court first distinguished two circumstances where the writ had been
found to apply - aliens seeking to prove their citizenship"6 and aliens
seeking to be admitted into the United States while being held in a port'6 ' -
and which were not at issue in petitioners' case. 162 The court then rejected
petitioners' contention that Johnson was inapplicable because the
government had not determined that they were enemy aliens, reasoning that
the lack of jurisdiction in Johnson had not "hinge[d] on the fact that the
petitioners were enemy aliens, but on the fact that they were aliens outside
territory over which the United States was sovereign."'' 63 To support its
156. Id. at 57. The court noted that while petitioners' amended petition sought to
"invoke... jurisdiction under a host of separate [statutory, constitutional and international law]
provisions, the suit (was] brought explicitly as a petition for writs of habeas corpus pursuant to
28 U.S.C. §§ 2241 and 2242." Id. at 62.
157. Id. at 58. Notwithstanding plaintiffs' efforts to avoid having the court construe their
case as a petition for a writ of habeas corpus, the court interpreted their request for access to the
courts or some other tribunal as "nothing more than a frontal assault on their confinement," a
species of claim recognized to fall "within the exclusive province of the writ of habeas corpus."
Id. at 63. Accordingly, the court treated the jurisdictional request as if it had been styled as a
petition for a writ of habeas corpus. Id.; see Chatman-Bey v. Thornburgh, 864 F.2d 804, 809
(D.C. Cir. 1988) (en banc) (noting that "the modem habeas cases teach, broadly, that habeas is
designed to test the lawfulness of the government's asserted right to detain an individual").
158. Rasul, 215 F. Supp. 2d at 58.
159. Id. at 61.
160. See Chin Chow v. United States, 208 U.S. 8, 13 (1908) (permitting habeas action for
person seeking admission into the country to assure hearing on citizenship claim).
161. See Nishimura Ekiu v. United States, 142 U.S. 651,660 (1892) (noting that "[a]n alien
immigrant, prevented from landing by any... officer claiming authority to do so under an act
of Congress, and thereby restrained of his liberty, is doubtless entitled to a writ of habeas
corpus to ascertain whether the restraint is lawful").
162. Rasul, 215 F. Supp. 2d at 66.
163. Id. at 67. In support of this proposition, the court relied on the Johnson passage in
which the court stated:
We have pointed out that the privilege of litigation has been extended to aliens,
whether friendly or enemy, only because permitting their presence in the country
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol56/iss3/3
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interpretation, the court cited Justice Douglas's observation in his dissent
that "'the Court's opinion inescapably denie[d] courts power to afford the
least bit of protection for any alien who [was] subject to our occupation
government abroad, even if he [was] neither enemy nor belligerent and even
after peace [was] officially declared." ''
Finally, the court addressed the remaining question, namely whether
under a de facto theory of sovereignty, the naval base at Guantanamo Bay
should be considered within the territorial jurisdiction of the United
States. 165 Finding petitioners' reliance on cases involving the rights of aliens
residing in sovereign territories of the United States misplaced," and
recognizing that courts had rejected in other contexts a de facto sovereignty
test for claims involving aliens at the naval base in Guantanamo, the court
concluded that the base was outside the sovereign territory of the United
States.167 Thus, applying Johnson, the court ruled that it lacked jurisdiction
to entertain the petitions.
6 1
On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia Circuit affirmed. 169  Adopting the district court's reading of
Johnson, the appellate court held that no court had jurisdiction to entertain
implied protection. No such basis can be invoked here, for these prisoners at no
relevant time were within any territory over which the United States is sovereign,
and the scenes of their offense, their capture, their trial and their punishment were
all beyond the territorial jurisdiction of any court of the United States.
Id. (quoting Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763, 777-78 (1950)). The court also relied on
subsequent Supreme Court decisions which have alluded to the rights of aliens outside of the
United States. Id. at 67-68; see Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 693 (2001) (citing Johnson
for the proposition "that certain constitutional protections available to persons inside the United
States are unavailable to aliens outside of our geographic borders"); United States v. Verdugo-
Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 269 (1990) (quoting Johnson for the proposition that the Court has
rejected the "extraterritorial application of the Fifth Amendment").
164. Rasul, 215 F. Supp. 2d at 68 (alteration in original) (quoting Johnson, 339 U.S. at 795-
96 (Douglas, J., dissenting)).
165. Id. When framing this question, the court noted that "[it was] undisputed, even by the
parties, that Guantanamo Bay is not part of the sovereign territory of the United States." Id. at
69.
166. Id. at 69; see, e.g., Ralpho v. Bell, 569 F.2d 607 (D.C. Cir. 1977). The Rasul court
found, contrary to petitioners' contentions, that Ralpho did not hold "that a court [could] grant
constitutional rights over a geographical area where defacto sovereignty [was] present. Rather,
Ralpho [stood] for a limited extension of the uncontested proposition that aliens residing in the
sovereign territories of the United States are entitled to certain basic constitutional rights."
Rasul, 215 F. Supp. 2d at 70.
167. Id. at 69-72.
168. Id. at 72-73.
169. AlOdah v. United States, 321 F.3d 1134, 1145 (D.C. Cir. 2003), cert. granted, 124 S.
Ct. 534 (2003).
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the petitions, "even if they ha[d] not been adjudicated enemies of the United
States."' o7 The Supreme Court granted cert in this case and has agreed to
consider whether federal courts lack jurisdiction to entertain challenges by
foreign nationals to the legality of their detention at Guantanamo Bay.
C. Discussion
Unless the Court abandons Johnson, it appears that a federal court may
not exercise jurisdiction over the petition of an alien detained at
Guantanamo Bay. Preliminarily, one should note that although the
November 13th order stated that any individual subject to it "shall not be
privileged to seek any remedy or maintain any proceeding, directly or
indirectly, or to have any such remedy or proceeding sought on [his] behalf
in ... any court of the United States, ' 171 if a federal court can exercise
jurisdiction, detainees under the order will enjoy access to limited judicial
review.'72 That being said, as was the case with the petitioners in Johnson,
the detainees in Guantanamo Bay are aliens who have been and continue to
be held abroad. 7 3 Further, a compelling argument exists that since at least
September 11, the United States and al Qaeda and its supporters have been
actively engaged in war - a war declared and initiated by al Qaeda174 - and
that these prisoners fall within the category of enemy aliens as identified in
170. Id. at 1141.
171. Military Order, supra note 15, § 7(b)(2).
172. See Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763, 775 (1950) ("The resident enemy alien is
constitutionally subject to summary arrest, internment and deportation whenever a 'declared
war' exists. Courts will entertain his plea for freedom from Executive custody only to ascertain
the existence of a state of war and whether he is an alien enemy and so subject to the Alien
Enemy Act."); see also Gonzales, supra note 36, at A27 ('The order preserves judicial review
in civilian courts. Under the order, anyone arrested, detained or tried in the United States by a
military commission will be able to challenge the lawfulness of the commission's jurisdiction
through a habeas corpus proceeding in a federal court.").
173. Al Odah, 321 F.3d at 1140 (noting that like the German prisoners, the Guantanamo
detainees "are aliens, they too were captured during military operations, they were in a foreign
country when captured, they are now abroad, they are in the custody of the American military,
and they have never had any presence in the United States"); see also Johnson, 339 U.S. at 777-
78 (noting that "the privilege of litigation has been extended to aliens, whether friendly or
enemy, only because permitting their presence in the country implied protection").
174. See Department of Justice Oversight: Preserving Our Freedoms While Defending
Against Terrorism: Hearing Before the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 107th Cong. 63 (2001)
(testimony of William P. Barr, Former Attorney General of the United States) ("It is clear that
a state of war exists between the United States and al Qaeda. Al Qaeda has openly proclaimed
a war against the United States and has repeatedly carried out attacks against us."). But see
Peter Spiro, Not War, Crimes, at http:llwrit.corporate.findlaw.com/commentary/20010919-
spiro.html (Sept. 19, 2002) (arguing that "the ultimate nature of the attacks is more akin to crime
than to war, and should to the maximum extent possible be addressed as such").
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Johnson.175 Additionally, it does not appear that the United States has
sovereignty over its naval base in Guantanamo Bay, a prerequisite for
jurisdiction. 76 Finally, it may be argued that entertaining petitions from
175. The district court in Rasul implicitly accepted petitioners' contentions that before they
could be considered "enemy aliens," a competent military tribunal had to make that
determination. Rasul v. Bush, 215 F. Supp. 2d 55, 66 (D.D.C. 2002), affd sub. nom. Al Odah
v. United States, 321 F.3d 1134 (D.C. Cir. 2003), cert. granted, 124 S. Ct. 534 (Nov. 10, 2003)
(No. 03-334). It further held that Johnson did "not apply only to those aliens deemed to be
'enemies' by a competent tribunal." Id. at 67. The court of appeals in Al Odah similarly found
that the Johnson holding was not limited to enemy aliens. Al Odah, 321 F.3d at 1139-40. In
the section of Coalition of Clergy vacated on appeal, the district court found that, in addition
to being aliens, the detainees were enemy combatants. Coalition of Clergy v. Bush, 189 F.
Supp. 2d 1036, 1048 (C.D. Cal. 2002), aff'd in part, vacated in part, 310 F.3d 1153 (9th Cir.
2002), and cert. denied, 123 S. Ct. 2073 (2003) (mem.) (Coalition of Clergy 1).
Some have noted that in Johnson "the Court took great pains to dwell on the differences
between the rights of enemy and friendly aliens," and that "[i]t was the existence of war between
the United States and the alien's homeland, not their alienage, which reduced the enemy alien's
rights. This reduction was justified because of the need to ensure war time security." Bryan W.
Horn, Note, The Extraterritorial Application of the Fifth Amendment Protection Against
Coerced Self-Incrimination, 2 DUKE J. COMP. & INT'LL. 367, 378 (1992) (citations omitted);
see Leigh-Ann Patterson, Comment, The Extraterritorial Application of the Fourth Amend-
ment- United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 110 S.Ct. 1056 (1990), 25 SuFFOLKU.L.REv. 289,
294 (1991) (noting the Court in Johnson "focused extensively on the special national security
dangers posed by an enemy alien, narrowing its holding by noting that 'enemy' status, not
'alien' status, deprived aliens of both interterritorial and extraterritorial protections during
war"). In this vein, it is argued that while Johnson "stands for the proposition that the courts
may deny habeas corpus to enemy aliens in occupied territories during a declared war, the
decision does not apply to the general treatment of non-enemy aliens abroad." John A. Ragosta,
Aliens Abroad: Principles for the Application of Constitutional Limitations to FederalActions,
17 N.Y.U. J. INT'LL. & POL. 287, 302-03 (1985) (citation omitted). A forceful contrary view,
however, also exists. See Al Odah, 321 F.3d at 1141 (interpreting Johnson and subsequent
Supreme Court cases to hold that basic constitutional protections are not available to aliens
abroad); Harbury v. Deutch, 233 F.3d 596, 604 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (arguing while Johnson
concerned the rights of enemy aliens during wartime, "the Supreme Court's extended and
approving citation of [Johnson in Verdugo-Urquidez] suggests that its conclusions regarding
extraterritorial application of the Fifth Amendment are not so limited"), rev'd on other grounds,
536 U.S. 403 (2002); Paul B. Stephan, I, Constitutional Limits on International Rendition of
Criminal Suspects, 20 VA. J. INT'LL. 777, 781 n. 14 (1980) ("[Johnson] involved enemy aliens
who had borne arms against the United States. Although the Court regarded this fact as
important, its opinion did not stress the distinction and much of the argument advanced therein
applies with equal force to foreign nationals other than enemy aliens.").
176. See Johnson, 339 U.S. at 778 ("[P]risoners at no relevant time were within any territory
over which the United States [was] sovereign."); Al Odah, 321 F.3d at 1143-44
("Sovereignty... means.., supreme dominion exercised by a nation. The United States has
sovereignty over the geographic area of the States and . . . over insular possessions.
Guantanamo Bay falls within neither category."). But see Anupam Chander, Guantanamo and
the Rule of Law: Why We Should Not Use Guantanamo Bay to Avoid the Constitution, at
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Guantanamo prisoners interferes with the prosecution of the war by the
Executive Branch. As aptly noted by the Court in Johnson, it is difficult to
envision a more efficient restraint on "a field commander than to allow the
very enemies he is ordered to reduce to submission to call him to account in
his own civil courts and divert his efforts and attention from the military
offensive abroad to the legal defensive at home."'77 Whether the Court will
depart from Johnson or distinguish it in any meaningful way remains to be
seen. 178
VII. The Designations of Hamdi and Padilla as Enemy Combatants
Commentators suggest that the designation of American citizens as enemy
combatants is taking place against a background of relatively unchartered
legal territory.' 79  Some maintain that designating American citizens as
enemy combatants calls for a balancing of "civil liberties principles of the
highest order - the right of American citizens to be free of indefinite
detention without charge - against the military's legitimate need to conduct
war overseas without answering every step of the way to the judiciary.' ' 8
Others contend that the issue is not whether the government can detain
enemy combatants outside the scope of criminal procedure, but rather
http://www.writ.corporate.findlaw.com/commentary/20020307_chander.html (Mar. 7, 2002)
(arguing that "[flor over a century, we have had complete control over Guantanamo Bay. We
should not now argue that - despite this longstanding and thoroughgoing control - we still
do not have sovereignty, because Guantanamo is technically Cuban soil.").
177. Johnson, 339 U.S. at 779. This is not to say, however, that these detainees may not
"have some form of rights under international law." Rasul, 215 F. Supp. 2d at 73.
178. One editorial noted:
It is often a mistake to read too much into a decision merely to hear a case; the
justices could simply have taken the matter because the case is of sufficient
importance that they felt obliged to resolve it from the top. But it's also possible
that some of the justices, like many other Americans are alarmed by the
administration's obstinate refusal to be governed by reasonable rules at
Guantanamo, where it is holding about 660 people.
Editorial, Justices at Guantanamo, WASH. POST, Nov. 11, 2003, at A24; see Linda Greenhouse,
It's a Question of Federal Turf, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 12, 2003, at Al ("[Tihe question of
jurisdiction - whether the courthouse doors are open to various categories of cases and
claimants - goes to the heart of the Supreme Court's role, as the court's critics as well as its
friends have always understood.").
179. See Editorial, Legal Limbo: 'Enemy Combatants' in Uncharted Territory, DALLAS
MORNING NEWS, Aug. 16, 2002, at 26A (commenting that "we are treading on new ground" in
connection with Hamdi's detention); Mitch Frank & Joe Pappalardo, Uncharted Legal
Territory, 159 TIME ATLANTIC 54 (2002) (noting that with respect to rules governing the
detention of combatants, prosecutors concede that "'[w]e are in uncharted legal territory').
180. Editorial, The Hamdi Mess, WASH. POST, Aug. 8, 2002, at A16.
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whether it should deny those so designated "any opportunity, ever, to tell
their side of the story to any court, any lawyer, or the public, and can instead
keep them in solitary confinement for months, years, perhaps decades -
even if they are U.S. citizens, and even if they were arrested in this country
in civilian clothes."'' Before discussing Hamdi and Padilla's arguments in
the courts, a brief summary of the government's facts in support of their
respective designations is warranted.
A. Yaser Esam Hamdi
In 2002, the U.S. government determined that Yaser Esam Hamdi, one of
the Guantanamo detainees, was an American citizen,1 82 and transferred him
to a naval brig in Norfolk, Virginia, where officials indicated he would be
held as an enemy combatant. 83 To support its decision designating Hamdi
as an enemy combatant,'84 the government maintained that in the summer of
2001, Hamdi traveled to Afghanistan where he joined a military unit and
obtained weapons training. 85 Later that year, he surrendered with his unit
to Northern Alliance forces, handing over a Kalashnikov rifle.'86 In
interviews, Hamdi also admitted that he traveled to Afghanistan "to train
with and, if necessary, to fight for the Taliban."' 87
B. Jose Padilla
Unlike Hamdi, who was captured in Afghanistan, Jose Padilla was
arrested in May 2002 at O'Hare International Airport on a material witness
181. Stuart J. Taylor, Detain 'Enemy Combatants' - But Give Them Hearings, 34 NAT'L
J. 2528, 2528 (2002); see Charles Lane, In Terror War, 2nd Rack for Suspects, WASH. POST,
Dec. 1, 2002, at AI (reporting that "[b]roadly speaking, the debate between the administration
and its critics is not so much about the methods the government seeks to employ as it is about
who should act as a check against potential abuses").
182. See supra note 11.
183. See supra note 12.
184. These facts are derived from a sworn declaration by Michael H. Mobbs, a Special
Advisor to the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, which was filed by the government in
connection with litigation that ensued (and which is discussed in more detail below). See
Respondents' Motion for Certification of Interlocutory Appeal and For Stay at 3, Hamdi v.
Rumsfeld, 243 F. Supp. 2d 527 (E.D. Va. 2002) (No. 2:02cv439), available at http://news.
findlaw.com/hdocs/docs/hamdi/hamdirums8l902gmot.pdf.
185. See Editorial, The Case Against Mr. Hamdi, WASH. POST, July 28, 2002, at B6; Tom
Jackman, U.S. Defies Judge on Enemy Combatant, WASH. POST, Aug. 7, 2002, at Al.
186. See The Case Against Mr. Hamdi, supra note 185, at B6; Tom Jackman, Father Says
"Combatant" Was Doing Relief Work, WASH. POST, Aug. 9, 2002, at A2.
187. The Case Against Mr. Hamdi, supra note 185, at B6; Prosecutors Detail Enemy
Combatant Case, N.Y. TIMEs, July 26, 2002, at A19.
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warrant.' 88 In June 2002, President Bush issued an order designating Padilla
as an enemy combatant and directed his transfer to the custody of the U.S.
military. 89
In support of Padilla's designation the government asserted the following
facts. 9° After Padilla was released from prison in the early 1990s, he
traveled to Egypt, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, and Afghanistan and became
associated with the al Qaeda network. 9' During 2001 and 2002, while in
Pakistan and Afghanistan, Padilla met with senior al Qaeda leaders on
several occasions and received training that included the wiring of explosive
devices. 192  In addition, he discussed participation and involvement in
terrorist operations targeting the United States with al Qaeda members,
including a plan to detonate a "radiological dispersal device" or dirty
bomb,' 93 and the detonation of explosive devices in gas stations and hotel
rooms.194 Multiple intelligence sources confirmed Padilla's involvement in
the planning of future terrorist attacks in the United States, including an
attack involving a dirty bomb.' 95
President Bush concluded that Padilla's designation as an enemy
combatant was "necessary to prevent him from aiding al Qaeda in its efforts
to attack the United States or its armed forces, or other governmental
personnel, or citizens."' 96 As noted by the President in his order designating
188. Padilla ex rel. Newman v. Bush, 233 F. Supp. 2d 564, 568-69 (S.D.N.Y. 2002), aff'd
in part, rev'd in part sub nom. Padilla v. Rumsfeld, 352 F.3d 695 (2d Cit. 2003).
189. Id. at 571.
190. These facts also are derived from another sworn declaration by Mobbs, which was filed
by the government in connection with litigation that ensued (and which is discussed in more
detail below). See Declaration of Michael H. Mobbs, Special Advisor To the Undersecretary
of Defense For Policy (Aug. 27, 2002) [hereinafter Mobbs Declaration], http://news.findlaw.
comlhdocs/docs/padilla/padillabush82702mobbs.pdf.
191. Mobbs Declaration, supra note 190, TI 4-5.
192. Id.996,9-10.
193. Dirty bombs "consist of radioactive material packed next to conventional explosives.
They do not produce the catastrophic destruction characteristic of nuclear explosions, but they
can contaminate areas enough to force a prolonged evacuation." Mitchel Maddux, Heading Off
Terror on the Waterfront, N.J. RECORD, Apr. 23, 2002, at Al; see Joby Warrick, Hunting a
Deadly Soviet Legacy, WASH. POST, Nov. 11, 2002, at Al (reporting that "[w]ith conventional
explosives and a few ounces of cesium 137 or strontium 90, a dirty bomb could contaminate
large swaths of real estate with dangerous radiation, unleashing panic and rendering some areas
uninhabitable for decades").
194. Mobbs Declaration, supra note 190, TI 8-9.
195. Id. 3.
196. Presidential Order of June 9, 2002, available at http://news.findlaw.conlhdocs/docs/
padilla/padillabush60902det.pdf (quoted in Respondents' Response To, and Motion to Dismiss
the Amended Petition For a Writ of Habeas Corpus at 8, Padilla ex rel. Newman v. Bush, 233
F. Supp. 2d 564 (S.D.N.Y. 2002) (No. 02CIV445(MBM)), available at http://news.findlaw.
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Padilla as an enemy combatant, Padilla had "engaged in conduct that
constituted hostile and war-like acts, including conduct in preparation for
acts of international terrorism that had the aim to cause injury to or adverse
effects on the United States," he "possesse[d] intelligence, including
intelligence about personnel and activities of al Qaeda that, if communicated
to the U.S., would aid U.S. efforts to prevent attacks by al Qaeda," and he
"represent[ed] a continuing, present and grave danger to the national
security of the United States."'97
VIII. Harhdi's and Padilla's Legal Challenges to Their Detentions
Hamdi and Padilla challenged their detentions by filing petitions for writs
of habeas corpus.' The arguments presented in their petitions and the
courts' responses to these arguments are discussed below.
A. Hamdi v. Rumsfeld
In June 2002, Esam Fouad Hamdi, Hamdi's father, filed a petition for a
writ of habeas corpus on behalf of Hamdi as next friend'99 in the United
States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, naming as
respondents Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld and Commander W.R.
Paulette.2" The petition alleged that Hamdi's detention violated the Fifth
and Fourteenth Amendments, and that, to the extent the President's order of
November 13th sought to foreclose any legal challenge to Hamdi's detention
by way of a writ of habeas corpus, it violated Article I of the U.S.
Constitution.20 ' In the prayer for relief, the petition requested, in part, that
counsel be appointed to represent Hamdi, that all interrogations cease while
the litigation was pending, and that he be released from custody.20 2
com/hdocs/docs/padilla/padillabush.pdf).
197. Id.
198. Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 296 F.3d 278, 279 (4th Cir. 2002), cert. granted, No. 03-6696,
2004 WL 42546 (U.S. Jan. 9,2004); Padilla ex rel. Newman v. Bush, 233 F. Supp. 2d 564,569
(S.D.N.Y. 2002), affd in part, rev'd in part sub nom., Padilla v. Rumsfeld, 352 F.3d 695 (2d
Cir. 2003).
199. See supra note 74.
200. Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus at 1, Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 296 F.3d 278 (4th Cir.
2002) (No. 2:02cv439) [hereinafter Petition], available athttp://news.findlaw.com/hdocs/docs/
hamdi/hamdirums6l02pet.pdf. This was the third petition filed on Hamdi's behalf. Two
earlier petitions, one filed by Frank Dunham, the Federal Public Defender for the Eastern
District of Virginia and a second by Christian Peregrim, a private citizen from New Jersey, were
dismissed because neither party had a significant relationship with Hamdi so as to possess "next
friend" standing to bring the suit. See Hamdi, 296 F.3d at 281.
201. Petition, supra note 200, at 6.
202. Id. at 7.
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The same day the petition was filed, the district court entered an order
appointing the Federal Public Defender to represent Hamdi and granting him
private access to his client.2"3 Two days later, the government filed a motion
for a stay of the district court's order with the United States Court of
Appeals for the Fourth Circuit.2"
In reversing the district court's order, the Fourth Circuit noted that "the
Supreme Court ha[d] shown great deference to the political branches when
called upon to decide cases implicating sensitive matters of foreign policy,
national security, or military affairs."2 " This deference, the court pointed
out, "extend[ed] to military designations of individuals as enemy combatants
in times of active hostilities, as well as to their detention after capture on the
field of battle."2"
Having acknowledged the Supreme Court's jurisprudence, the court found
that the order appointing counsel for Hamdi and providing counsel with
unmonitored access failed to address serious questions without the benefit
of full briefing and argument." For example, the order failed to consider
the effect to the government's intelligence gathering efforts by granting
Hamdi unrestricted access to counsel and the extent to which courts were
authorized to review combatant status designations.0 8 Rather, the order
appeared to assume that Hamdi was not an enemy combatant or, if he was,
that he had the right to counsel with unfettered access.20 9 In either case, the
203. Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, No. 2:02cv439 (E.D. Va. June 11, 2002) (order granting Hamndi
access to public defender), available at http://news.findlaw.comhdocs/docs/hamdi/
hamdirums6l02ord.pdf. The order provided that the "meeting [was] to be private between
Hamdi, the attorney, and the interpreter, without military personnel present, and without any
listening or recording devices of any kind being employed in any way." Id. at 3.
204. See Hamdi, 296 F.3d at 281.
205. Id.
206. Id.
207. Id. at 282. To illustrate this point, the court noted:
[I]t has been the government's contention that Hamdi is an "enemy combatant"
and as such "may be detained at least for the duration of the hostilities." The
government has asserted that "enemy combatants who are captured and detained
on the battlefield in a foreign land" have "no general right under the laws and
customs of war, or the Constitution... to meet with counsel concerning their
detention, much less to meet with counsel in private, without military authorities
present." The Public Defender for his part has contended that "no evidence has
been submitted to support" Hamdi's status as an enemy combatant and that
"unlike aliens located outside the United States, Petitioner Hamdi [as an American
citizen detained in the United States] is entitled to constitutional protections"
including unmonitored access to counsel.
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court reasoned that each of these alternative theories in support of the
district court's ruling had "sweeping implications for the posture of the
judicial branch during a time of international conflict, and neither [could]
rest on a procedurally flawed foundation that denied both petitioner[] and
the government a chance to properly present their arguments, or to lay even
a modest foundation for meaningful appellate review."10 Accordingly, the
appellate court reversed the district court's order.2 '
The government, however, further urged that the petition should be
dismissed altogether because "' given the constitutionally limited role of the
courts in reviewing military decisions, courts may not second-guess the
military's determination that an individual is an enemy combatant and
should be detained as such.'"2 The Fourth Circuit rejected this contention,
finding that if it dismissed the petition, it "would be summarily embracing
a sweeping proposition - namely, that with no meaningful judicial review,
any American citizen alleged to be an enemy combatant could be detained
indefinitely without charges or counsel on the government's say-so."2"3
Declining that invitation, the appellate court opted to remand the case to the
district court.214
In the context of the remand, the Fourth Circuit cautioned that the
executive branch, rather than the legislative or judicial branches of
government, was "best prepared to exercise... military judgment attending
the capture of alleged combatants" and that "any judicial inquiry into
Hamdi's status as an alleged enemy combatant in Afghanistan [needed to]
reflect a recognition that government has no more profound responsibility
than the protection of Americans, both military and civilian, against
additional unprovoked attack."2 5 Further, while the court insisted that the
procedures and standards governing the case on remand were not presently
at issue, it stressed that, under separation-of-power principles, the standard
of review governing the designation of Hamdi as an enemy combatant "must
not present a risk of saddling military decision-making with the panoply of
encumbrances associated with civil litigation."2"' To that end, the district
210. Id. at282-83.
211. Id. at 283.
212. Id. (quoting Brief For Respondents-Appellants at 29-30, Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 296 F.3d
278 (4th Cir. 2002) (No. 2:02cv439), available at http://news.findlaw.com/hdocs/docs/hamdi/
hamdirums619O2gbrf.pdf).
213. Id.
214. Id. at 283-84.
215. Id. at 283.
216. Id. at 283-84. As the court explained, "allowing alleged combatants to call American
commanders to account in federal courtrooms would stand the warmaking powers of Articles
I and 11 on their heads." Id. at 284.
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court was directed to "consider the most cautious procedures first, conscious
of the prospect that the least drastic procedures may promptly resolve
Hamdi's case and make more intrusive measures unnecessary.""1 7 The court
also cautioned that the role of counsel was a question which needed careful
consideration." 8
Upon remand, the government filed a two-page declaration by Michael H.
Mobbs, Special Advisor to the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy,
explaining why it was holding Hamdi.2" 9 Finding the proffer in Mobbs'
declaration insufficient, the district court sought copies of all statements
made by Hamdi, including those "conducted solely for intelligence
purposes," the names and addresses of those who interrogated him,
statements by members of the Northern Alliance regarding the
circumstances of Hamdi's capture, and other sensitive material.22° The
government declined to provide the information, and following an appeal,
the Fourth Circuit directed the district court to consider whether the
declaration alone contained sufficient information to label Hamdi an enemy
combatant.22" ' The district court held the declaration insufficient and
reinstated its earlier demand for additional information leading to another
appeal to the Fourth Circuit.
22
The Fourth Circuit ruled that the government did not need to provide the
materials requested by the district court because doing so risked "'stand[ing]
the warmaking powers of Articles I and U on their heads.' ' 223 As to whether
217. Id. at 284.
218. Id.
219. See Jackman, supra note 186, at A2. The essential facts in that declaration are
discussed at supra text accompanying notes 184-87.
220. See Respondents' Motion for Certification of Interlocutory Appeal and For Stay at 8,
Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 243 F. Supp. 2d 527 (E.D. Va. 2002) (No. 2:02cv439), available at
http://news.findlaw.com/hdocsdocs/hamdi/hamdirums8l9O2gmot.pdf; Editorial, Hal fRight on
Mr. Hamdi, WASH. POST, Aug. 20,2002, at A12.
221. Hamdi, 296 F.3d at 284; see Tom Jackman, Judge Demands More Facts on
"Combatant," WASH. POST, Aug. 17, 2002, at A9; Tom Jackman, Judge Skewers U.S. Curbs
on Detainee, WASH. POST, Aug. 14, 2002, at A10.
222. Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 243 F. Supp. 2d 527, 534, 536 (E.D. Va. 2002), rev'd 316 F.3d
450 (4th Cir. 2003), and cert. granted No. 03-6696, 2004 WL 42546 (U.S. Jan. 9,2004); Tom
Jackman, Judge AllowsAppeal of "Combatant" Order, WASH. POST, Aug. 22, 2002, at B2; U.S.
Says Courts Have No Say in Combatant Case, WASH. POST, Oct. 5, 2002, at A12.
223. Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 316 F.3d 450, 470 (4th Cir. 2003), cert. granted No. 03-6696,
2004 WL 42546 (U.S. Jan. 9, 2004) (alteration in original) (quoting Hamdi, 296 F.3d at 284).
For example, the court found the production of all of Hamdi's statements and any notes from
his interviews problematic because "it [was] precisely such statements, relating to a detainee's
activities in Afghanistan, that may contain the most sensitive and the most valuable information
for our forces in the field." Id.
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Hamdi's petition should be dismissed or remanded for further proceedings,
the court ruled that no further factual inquiry or evidentiary hearing was
necessary in connection with the enemy combatant designation because
Hamdi indisputably had been apprehended abroad in an active combat
operations zone and further inquiry on this question would interfere with the
conduct of military affairs.224 Applying the principles of Quirin, the court
reasoned that "[t]he privilege of citizenship entitle[d] Hamdi to a limited
judicial inquiry into his detention, but only to determine its legality under
the war powers of the political branches. 225
In December 2003, eleven months after the court's ruling in Hamdi
effectively barring counsel from a habeas corpus proceeding involving a
citizen designated as an enemy combatant and captured abroad, the
government announced that Hamdi would be permitted access to a lawyer.
2 26
Government officials indicated that the military had completed its
intelligence collection efforts regarding Hamdi and that national security
interests would not be compromised by affording him access to counsel at
2271this time. Officials further emphasized "that the decision was a matter of
policy, not law. 228
224. Id. at 473.
225. Id. at 475. The court also rejected Hamdi's contention that his detention was barred by
18 U.S.C. § 4001(a) and Article 5 of the Geneva Convention. As to § 4001(a), which provides
that "'[nJo citizen shall be imprisoned or otherwise detained by the United States except
pursuant to an Act of Congress,"' the court ruled that, even assuming this provision applied in
the present circumstances, the joint resolution authorized such detention. Id. at467-68 (quoting
18 U.S.C. § 4001 (2000)). Additionally, the court found support for Hamdi's detention in 10
U.S.C. § 956(5) which authorized "expenditure of funds for 'the maintenance, pay, and
allowances of prisoners of war [and] other persons in the custody of the [military] whose status
is determined... to be similar to prisoners of war."' Id. at 467 (alterations in original) (quoting
10 U.S.C. § 956(5) (2000)). As to Article 5 of the Geneva Convention, which requires the
determination of status as an enemy belligerent to be made "'by a competent tribunal,"' the
court ruled that the Geneva Convention did not create a private right of action. Id. at 468
(quoting Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, Aug. 12, 1949, art.
5, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 3324, 75 U.N.T.S. 135, 142). But even if it did, it was not at all clear that an
Article 1I court was the appropriate tribunal to make such a determination. Id. at 469. One
critic of this ruling has argued that the court's "diluted level ofjudicial review is tantamount to
an abdication" and that "[t]he court valorizes separation of powers principles, including its
grandiose construction of the President's war powers, at the expense of checks and balances."
Susan Herman, Yasser Hamdi and the Fourth Circuit's Legal No-Man's Land, JURIST 14 (Jan.
13, 2003), at http://jurist.law.pitt.edu/forum/forumnew84.php.
226. Jerry Markon & Dan Eggen, U.S. Allows Lawyer for Citizen Held as 'Enemy
Combatant,' WASH. POST, Dec. 3, 2003, at Al.
227. Lawyer Allowed for Man in Brig, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 3, 2003, at A28.
228. Dan Eggen, Decision to Allow Lawyer for 'Enemy Combatant'Is New Policy, WASH.
POST, Dec. 4, 2003, at A10. As noted earlier, the U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari in the
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B. Padilla v. Bush
In June 2002, attorney Donna R. Newman filed a petition for a writ of
habeas corpus on Jose Padilla's behalf in the United States District Court for
the Southern District of New York, naming as respondents President Bush,
Attorney General John Ashcroft, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld,
and Commander M.A. Marr. 229 Later that same month, as next friend,
Newman filed an amended petition alleging that (1) Padilla's detention
violated the Fourth, Fifth, and Sixth Amendments to the U.S. Constitution;
(2) to the extent the President's order foreclosed a legal challenge to the
detention by way of the writ of habeas corpus, it constituted an "unlawful
Suspension of the Writ, in violation of Article I of the United States
Constitution;" and (3) Padilla's detention violated the Posse Comitatus
Act.
230
The government moved to dismiss the amended petition on a number of
grounds, arguing, in part, that Padilla's counsel lacked standing to bring the
petition as "next friend" and that the court lacked jurisdiction over any
properly named respondent.23' Alternatively, the government argued that the
court should transfer the case to South Carolina where Padilla was
detained. 2  Regarding the lawfulness of the detention, the government
argued that it had been established by a sealed declaration filed with the
court.
23 3
The district court ruled that Padilla's counsel had standing as "next
friend" to file the petition on his behalf and that it had jurisdiction over one
of the respondents named in the petition (Secretary Rumsfeld), thereby
case as this Article went to press.
229. Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus, Padilla ex rel. Newman v. Bush, 233 F. Supp. 2d
564 (S.D.N.Y. 2002) (No. 02CIV445(MBM)), available at http://news.findlaw.com/hdocsl
docs/padilla/padillaus61lO2pet.pdf; see also David Johnston, F.B.L Talked of Following Bomb
Suspect Before Arrest, N.Y. TIMES, June 13, 2002, at A32.
230. Amended Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus at 7-8, Padilla ex rel. Newman v. Bush,
233 F. Supp. 2d 564 (S.D.N.Y. 2002) (No. 02CIV445(MBM)), available at http://news.
findlaw.comlhdocs/docs/padillalpadillabush6l902apet.pdf. The Posse Comitatus Act, 18
U.S.C. § 1385, establishes criminal penalties for the willful use of "any part of the Army or the
Air Force" in law enforcement, unless expressly authorized by the Constitution or an act of
Congress. 18 U.S.C. § 1385 (2000). The substantive provisions of the Posse Comitatus Act
apply to the Navy through 10 U.S.C. § 375. 10 U.S.C. § 375 (2000).
231. Padilla ex rel. Newman v. Bush, 233 F. Supp. 2d 564, 569 (S.D.N.Y. 2002), affd in
part, rev'd in part sub nom. Padilla v. Rumsfeld, 352 F.3d 695 (2d Cir. 2003).
232. Id.
233. Id. at 572; see supra note 188. In the event the court found that declaration deficient,
the government also submitted another sealed declaration by the same affiant. Padilla, 233 F.
Supp. 2d at 572.
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obviating the need to transfer the case to South Carolina."' Having resolved
these procedural and jurisdictional questions, the court then addressed the
lawfulness of Padilla's detention, his right to consult with counsel, and the
standard of review governing the executive branch's designation of an
American citizen as an enemy combatant who is not captured abroad in the
field of battle.235
1. The President's Authority to Designate American Citizens as Enemy
Combatants
Padilla and amici z36 argued that because the United States was not
engaged in a conventional war, the President could "not use his powers as
Commander in Chief or apply the laws of war to Padilla. '2 37 Additionally,
they argued that because Padilla was an American citizen, and the civilian
courts were available, indefinite detention was unconstitutional. 38  The
court rejected both contentions.
First, the court held that legal precedent established that the President
may exercise his powers as Commander in Chief even when Congress has
not issued a formal declaration of war.2 39  Moreover, assuming that
congressional authorization was necessary to declare war, the joint
234. Padilla, 233 F. Supp. 2d at 575-87.
235. Id. at 587-610. In a footnote, the court summarily dismissed Padilla's argument that
his detention violated the Posse Comitatus Act, finding that even assuming the statute was
enforceable in a habeas corpus proceeding, he was not being detained for violating a civilian
law or to execute such a law. Id. at 588 n.9.
236. The New York State and the National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers, the
American and New York Civil Liberties Union Foundations, and the Center for National
Security Studies filed briefs arguing that Padilla's detention was unlawful. Id. at 569 n.2.
237. Id. at 588.
238. Id.
239. Relying on The Prize Cases, 67 U.S. (2 Black) 635 (1862), the court determined that
"a formal declaration of war is not necessary in order for the executive... to prosecute an
armed conflict - particularly when, as on September 11, the United States is attacked."
Padilla, 233 F. Supp. 2d at 589; see Campbell v. Clinton, 203 F.3d 19, 27 (D.C. Cir. 2000)
(Silberman, J., concurring) ("I read the Prize Cases to stand for the proposition that the
President has independent authority to repel aggressive acts by third parties even without
specific congressional authorization, and courts may not review the level of force selected.").
As to formally declared wars, the court observed:
Taking into account only the modem era, the last declared war was World War II.
Since then, this country has fought the Korean War, the Viet Nam War, the
Persian Gulf War, and the Kosovo bombing campaign, as well as other military
engagements in Lebanon, Haiti, Grenada and Somalia, to cite a random and by no
means exhaustive list, with no appellate authority holding that a declaration of war
was necessary.
Padilla, 233 F. Supp. 2d at 590.
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resolution authorizing the use of force "engage[d] the President's full
powers as Commander in Chief."2" As to Padilla's American citizenship
and the fact that officials captured him on American soil when the civilian
courts were in operation, the court preliminarily noted that (1) the laws of
war drew a distinction between unlawful and lawful combatants, and (2)
"when the President designated Padilla an 'enemy combatant,' he
necessarily meant that Padilla was an unlawful combatant, acting as an
associate of a terrorist organization whose operations d[id] not meet the four
criteria necessary to confer lawful combatant status on its members and
adherents. '24 ' Accordingly, the court deemed it immaterial that Padilla was
an American citizen and that the civilian courts were in operation.242 The
court also found support for its determination that the President had the
authority to order the detention of an American citizen as an unlawful
combatant 243 in the Supreme Court's ruling in Quirin recognizing that
unlawful combatants were "'subject to capture and detention.' '2' Having
240. Padilla, 233 F. Supp. 2d at 590; see supra note 2.
241. Padilla, 233 F. Supp. 2d at 592-93.
242. Id. at 593. The court distinguished Ex Parte Milligan, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 2 (1866), upon
which Padilla relied, on the grounds that the Milligan petitioner was not an enemy belligerent.
Padilla, 233 F. Supp. 2d at 593.
243. The court also rejected the contentions that Padilla's seemingly indefinite detention was
illegal and also barred by 18 U.S.C. § 4001(a) which, as noted previously, provides that "[n]o
citizen shall be imprisoned or otherwise detained by the United States except pursuant to an Act
of Congress." 18 U.S.C. § 4001 (2000). With respect to the former, the court determined that
"[a]t some point in the future, when operations against al Qaeda fighters end, or the operational
capacity of al Qaeda is effectively destroyed, there may be occasion to debate the legality of
continuing to hold prisoners based on their connection to al Qaeda, assuming such prisoners
continue to be held at that time." Padilla, 233 F. Supp. 2d at 590. As to the latter, the court
held that the joint resolution was for all intents and purposes an "Act of Congress"; therefore,
the statute was not violated. Id. at 598.
244. Padilla, 233 F. Supp. 2d at 595 (quoting Exparte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1, 31 (1942)). The
Padilla court reasoned:
[Ilt appears that the [Supreme] Court touched directly on the subject at issue in
this case when it said that "[u]nlawful combatants are likewise subject to capture
and detention." Although the issue of detention alone was not before the Court
in Quirin, I read the quoted sentence to mean that as between detention alone, and
trial by a military tribunal with exposure to the penalty actually meted out to
petitioners in Quirin - death - or, at the least, exposure to a sentence of
imprisonment intended to punish and deter, the Court regarded detention alone,
with the sole aim of preventing the detainee from rejoining hostile forces - a
consequence visited upon captured lawful combatants - as certainly the lesser of
the consequences an unlawful combatant could face. If, as seems obvious, the
Court in fact regarded detention alone as a lesser consequence than the one it was
considering - trial by military tribunal - and it approved even that greater
consequence, then our case is afortiori from Quirin as regards the lawfulness of
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concluded that Padilla's detention was not per se unlawful, the court next
addressed the role of counsel.
2. The Role of Counsel
The court found that Padilla had no right to counsel under the Sixth
Amendment 45 because he was not detained pursuant to any criminal
proceeding.2" Regarding the Fifth Amendment, 247 the court held that the
self-incrimination clause did not support a right to counsel because Padilla
did not confront the prospect of a criminal trial. 48 The court found it
unnecessary to determine whether the due process clause of the Fifth
Amendment provided Padilla with such a right because there were
nonconstitutional alternatives: the All Writs Act249 and the habeas corpus
statute. 5°
With respect to the habeas corpus statute, the court found that it was
"clear that Congress intended habeas corpus petitioners to have an
opportunity to present and contest facts, and courts to have the flexibility to
permit them to do so under proper safeguards. '' 25 ' As to the All Writs Act,
the court determined that Supreme Court jurisprudence suggested a broad
interpretation of the "power of a court hearing a habeas corpus petition to
fashion remedies. 252 In light of these statutes, the court held that Padilla
should be permitted to consult with counsel in connection with his petition,
and in particular, the declaration submitted by the government in support of
detention under the law of war.
Id. (alteration in original) (citation omitted) (quoting Quirin, 317 U.S. at 31).
245. The Sixth Amendment provides in part that "[in all criminal prosecutions, the accused
shall enjoy the right to... have the Assistance of Counsel for his defense." U.S. CONST. amend.
VI.
246. Padilla, 233 F. Supp. 2d at 600.
247. The Fifth Amendment provides in part that "[no person... shall be compelled in any
criminal case to be a witness against himself, nor be deprived of life, liberty, or property,
without due process of law." U.S. CONST. amend. V.
248. Padilla, 233 F. Supp. 2d at 601; see United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259,
264 (1990) (noting that violation of the right against self-incrimination "occurs only at trial").
249. 28 U.S.C. § 1651 (2000). The All Writs Act provides that "all courts established by Act
of Congress may issue all writs necessary or appropriate in aid of their respective jurisdictions
and agreeable to the usages and principles of law." Id. § 1651 (a).
250. Padilla, 233 F. Supp. 2d at 601.
251. Id. at 601-02.
252. Id.; see also Harris v. Nelson, 394 U.S. 286, 299 (1969) ("[Tjhe habeas corpus
jurisdiction and the duty to exercise it being present, the courts may fashion appropriate modes
of procedure, by [any] analogy to existing rules or otherwise in conformity with judicial
usage.... Their authority is expressly confirmed in the All Writs Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1651.")
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his detention.253 Further, as to the government's concern that Padilla might
use his lawyer to pass messages to others, the court found this concern to be
conjectural and noted that military personnel could "monitor Padilla's
contacts with counsel, so long as those who participate[d] in the monitoring
[were] insulated from any activity in connection with [the] petition, or in
connection with a future criminal prosecution of Padilla, if there should ever
be one. 254 The court left it to the parties to determine the conditions under
which counsel could confer with Padilla.
' 255
3. The Standard of Review
In setting forth the standard that would govern the review of the petition,
the court recognized that when, as in the case before it, political branches
exercised war power judgments under Articles I and 11, those judgments
were not so much subject to review by Article I courts as they were "to the
perhaps less didactic but nonetheless searching audit of the democratic
process. 25 6 Accordingly, the court limited judicial review of the President's
enemy combatant designation to two questions. First, was there "some
253. Padilla, 233 F. Supp. 2d at 603; see Nicholas A. Kacprowski, Note, Stacking the Deck
Against Suspected Terrorists: The Dwindling Procedural Limits on the Government's Power
to Indefinitely Detain United States Citizens as Enemy Combatants, 26 SEATrLEU. L. REV. 651,
669 (2003) ("One notable effect of the Padilla court's finding that there was a statutory, as
opposed to constitutional, right to counsel, is that it allows courts greater flexibility in denying
enemy combatants the right to counsel, rather than establishing an immutable right.").
254. Padilla, 233 F. Supp. 2d. at 603-04. The court found that employing the government's
logic, no member of al Qaeda facing prosecution in an Article HI court would have access to
counsel, a result barred by the Sixth Amendment. Id. Further, the sealed and unsealed
declarations filed by the government did not support the contention that Padilla was trained to
transmit information in the way the government feared, and in any event, any damage had
already taken place because Padilla had met with counsel before being designated an enemy
combatant. Id. at 604. Lastly, Padilla's lawyers were officers of the court and nothing in their
past conduct suggested that they would act as conduits for Padilla. Id.
255. Id. at 605. Contrasting the ruling in Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 296 F.3d 278 (4th Cir. 2002),
cert. granted No. 03-6696, 2004 WL 42546 (U.S. Jan. 9, 2004), where the Fourth Circuit
reversed the order of a district court directing the government to permit unmonitored access by
counsel to Hamdi, the Padilla court pointed out that "[n]o such access is to be granted here."
Padilla, 233 F. Supp. 2d at 604.
256. Padilla, 233 F. Supp. 2d at 604. Article I, Section 8 of the U.S. Constitution grants
Congress the power to "provide for the common Defence and general Welfare of the United
States... [tlo Declare War, grant Letters of Marque and Reprisal, and make Rules concerning
Captures on Land and Water ... [tlo raise and support armies ... [and] [t]o provide and
maintain a Navy." U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8. Article II, Section 2 provides that "[t]he President
shall be Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy of the United States, and of the Militia of
the several States, when called into the actual Service of the United States." U.S. CONST. art.
H, § 2, cl. 1.
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol56/iss3/3
2003] ENEMY COMBATANTS, COURTS & THE CONSTITUTION 611
evidence" that Padilla participated in a wartime mission against the United
States with an enemy of the United States?2" Second, was that evidence
"mooted by subsequent events?""' The government responded by filing a
more detailed submission, explaining the potentially adverse consequences
of granting Padilla access to counsel.259 The court again ruled that Padilla
had the right to consult with a lawyer before he responded to the
government's claim that he was an enemy combatant, and the government
appealed the ruling.2"
4. The Second Circuit's Ruling
On appeal, in a split decision, the Second Circuit ruled that the President
did not have the inherent authority under the Constitution to detain
American citizens as enemy combatants when they were "seized on
American soil outside a zone of combat."26' The majority reasoned that the
257. In a subsequent ruling, the court explained that the application of the "some evidence"
standard assured that the executive branch did not deprive a person of his liberty arbitrarily.
Padilla ex rel. Newman v. Bush, 243 F. Supp. 2d 42 (opinion and order granting motion to
reconsider, at 27), available at http://news.findlaw.com/hdocs/docs/padilla/padillarums31103
opn.pdf. Thus, Padilla was entitled to
present evidence that undermine[d] the reliability of the Mobbs Declaration.
Furthermore, inasmuch as Padilla ha[d] not yet been heard at all on the subject,
he [was] entitled to present evidence that conflict[ed] with what [was] set forth in
the Mobbs Declaration, and to have that evidence considered alongside the Mobbs
Declaration.
Id. at 31.
258. Padilla, 233 F. Supp. 2d at 608; see Kacprowski, supra note 253, at 694-95 (noting that
the most significant innovation of the court's ruling "was allowing ... enemy combatants to
present facts and evidence of their own in support of their challenge to their classification, and
holding that it would evaluate the evidence presented by the government supporting the
classification and not just the legal sufficiency of the changes.").
259. See Editorial, Fear of Lawyers, WASH. POST, Jan. 19, 2003, at B6.
260. See Padilla ex rel. Newman v. Bush, 243 F. Supp. 2d 42 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) (opinion and
order denying motion to reconsider, at 35), available at http://news.findlaw.com/hdocs/docsl
padilla/padillarums31103opn. pdf; Associated Press, Prosecutors WillAppealRuling on Access
to Counsel, WASH. POST, Mar. 26, 2003, at A2; Paula Span, Enemy Combatant Vanishes into
a 'Legal Black Hole,' WASH. POST., July 30, 2003, at Al (reporting that ruling has been
appealed and that the government had filed its opening brief).
261. Padilla ex rel. Newman v. Bush, 352 F.3d 695, 698 (2d Cir. 2003). The majority
stressed that its ruling was "limited to the case of an American citizen arrested in the United
States, not on a foreign battlefield or while actively engaged in armed conflict against the United
States." Id. at 711; id at 713 ("[W]e do not concern ourselves with the Executive's inherent
wartime power, generally, to detain enemy combatants on the battlefield. Rather, we are called
on to decide whether the Constitution gives the President the power to detain an American
citizen seized in this country until the war with al Qaeda ends."); id. at 715 n.24 ("We only hold
that the President's Commander-in-Chief powers do not encompass the detention of a United
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Constitution's explicit grant of powers to Congress to define and punish
offenses under the Offenses Clause,262 to suspend the writ of habeas corpus
under the Suspension Clause,2 63 and to allow for the quartering of troops
under the Third Amendment, but only as permitted by law,26" demonstrated
"a powerful indication that, absent express congressional authorization, the
President's Commander-in-Chief powers [did] not support Padilla's
confinement.""26 The majority further rejected the contention that Quirin
supported the argument that the President has inherent authority as
Commander-in-Chief to detain American citizens domestically as enemy
combatants because in Quirin, there had been an express congressional
authorization to establish military commissions to try combatants who had
violated the laws of war.26
Having concluded that the President possessed no inherent constitutional
authority to detain Padilla, the majority then turned to the question of
specific congressional authorization. 26' The answer to this question, the
majority found, was framed by the specific prohibition in the Non-Detention
Act 268 against the detention of citizens "except pursuant to an Act of
Congress. ' 269 And with respect to this prohibition, the majority concluded
that neither the joint resolution authorizing the use of force, nor 10 U.S.C.
§ 956(5) which provides for the funding of military detentions, authorized
Padilla's detention. 270 As to the resolution, the majority determined that it
lacked specific language "authorizing the detention of American citizens
captured on United States soil, much less the express authorization required
by section 4001 [of the Non-Detention Act]. '27' With respect to § 956(5),
States citizen as an enemy combatant taken into custody on United States soil outside a zone of
combat.").
262. U.S. CONST. art. 11, § 8, cl. 10.
263. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 2.; see supra note 70.
264. U.S. CONST. amend. I. The full text of that amendment states: "No Soldier shall, in
time of peace be quartered in any house, without the consent of the Owner, nor in time of war,
but in a manner to be prescribed by law." Id.
265. Padilla, 352 F.3d at 715.
266. Id. at 715-16. The majority also found that the precedential value of Quirin was
"sharply attenuated" by the fact that "the Quirin Court did not have to contend with" 18 U.S.C.
§ 4001, which prohibits the detention of Americans "except pursuant to an Act of Congress."
Id. at 716.
267. Id. at 718.
268. 18 U.S.C. § 4001(a); see discussion supra note 243.
269. Padilla, 352 F.3d at 718 (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 4001(a) (2000)). The majority rejected
the government's contention that § 4001 (a) applied only to detentions by the Attorney General
and not the military. Id. at 720-22.
270. Id. at 724.
271. Id. at 723. In support of its reasoning, the majority relied in part on Exparte Endo, 323
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the majority found that, regarding American citizens captured away from the
battlefield, the general authorization for expenditure of money contained in
§ 956(5) was insufficient to support their detention.272
In a forceful partial dissent,273 Judge Wesley argued that the majority's
reasoning was deficient on two major points. First, Judge Wesley
maintained that the President's inherent powers as Commander in Chief -
in a time of recognized armed conflict - authorized the order calling for the
detention and interrogation of Padilla.274 He found that even though
Congress can utilize war powers in the domestic policy context, for example,
in defining and punishing offenses committed on American soil, suspending
the writ of habeas corpus, and determining whether and if soldiers will be
quartered in private homes in times of war, none of those powers were at
issue in the case involving Padilla.2 5 More significantly, Judge Wesley
noted, the majority's opinion failed to "cite a specific constitutional
provision in which Congress [was] given exclusive constitutional authority
to determine how our military forces will deal with the acts of a belligerent
on American soil." '276 Further, and relying on the teaching of The Prize
Cases,277 Judge Wesley concluded that congressional authorization was not
necessary for the President to prosecute an armed conflict in response to an
U.S. 283 (1944) where, in discussing the exercise of war powers, the Supreme Court observed
that "when asked to find implied powers in a grant of legislative or executive authority [the
Court would assume] that the law makers intended to place no greater restraint on the citizen
than was clearly and unmistakably indicated by the language they used." Id. at 300. Applying
Endo, the majority found that
[w]hile it may be possible to infer a power of detention from the Joint Resolution
in the battlefield context where detentions are necessary to carry out the war, there
[was] no reason to suspect from the language of the Joint Resolution that Congress
believed it would be authorizing the detention of an American citizen already held
in a federal correctional institution and not 'arrayed against our troops' in the field
of battle.
Padilla, 352 F.3d at 723.
272. Id. at 724.
273. Judge Wesley concurred with aspects of the majority's opinion relating to Padilla's
counsel's standing as "next friend" with respect to the petition that was filed and the exercise
of personal jurisdiction over the Secretary of Defense. Id. at 726 n. 1 (Wesley, J., concurring in
part, dissenting in part). He would have affirmed the ruling of the district court that Padilla was
entitled to the assistance of counsel in challenging the lawfulness of his continued detention
through a writ of habeas corpus. Id. (Wesley, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
274. Id. at 727.
275. Id.
276. Id.
277. 67 U.S. (2 Black) 635 (1862); see supra note 239.
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attack on the United States.278
In addition to the President's inherent powers under Article 1I, Judge
Wesley observed that the joint resolution authorizing the use of force
provided ample support for the President's action.279 Judge Wesley found
that the plain language of the resolution authorized the President to use all
appropriate and necessary force to prevent future terrorist attacks against the
United States and that Padilla, who was "alleged to be closely associated
with an al Qaeda plan to carry out an attack in the United States," fell within
its sweep.28° As to the majority's contention that the resolution lacked the
specificity required to authorize detentions, and therefore, did not qualify
under the exception to 18 U.S.C. § 4001(a)'s prohibition against the
detention of citizens (i.e., other than through an act of Congress), Judge
Wesley found that it would be anomalous to read the resolution as
"authoriz[ing] the interdiction and shooting of an al Qaeda operative but not
the detention of that person."281 Judge Wesley also made the point that there
was nothing in the resolution limiting its scope or suggesting that the
President's response to the attacks was limited to foreign theaters.282
278. Padilla, 352 F.3d at 727-28. Judge Wesley found the majority's "zone of combat"
analysis flawed. As he explained:
My colleagues ... conclude that somehow the President has no power to deal with
acts of a belligerent on U.S. soil "away from a zone of combat" absent express
authorization from Congress. That would seem to imply that the President does
have some war power authority to detain a citizen on U.S. soil if the "zone of
combat" was the United States. The majority does not tell us who has the
authority to define a "zone of combat" or to designate a geopolitical area as such.
Given the majority's view that "the Constitution lodges... [inherent national
emergency powers] with Congress, not the President," it would seem that the
majority views this responsibility as also the singular province of Congress. That
produces a startling conclusion. The President would be without any authority to
detain a terrorist citizen dangerously close to a violent or destructive act on U.S.
soil unless Congress declared the area in question a zone of combat or authorized
the detention.
Id. at 728 (citations omitted).
279. Id. at 729.
280. Id. at 729-30.
281. Id. at 730-31; see supra notes 225, 243.
282. Id. at 731-32. As Judge Wesley aptly reasoned:
The resolution was a congressional confirmation that the nation was in crisis.
Congress called upon the President to utilize his Article II war powers to deal with
the emergency. By authorizing the President to use necessary and appropriate
force against al Qaeda and its operatives, Congress had to know the President
might detain someone who fell within the categories of identified belligerents in
carrying out his charge. A different view requires a strained reading of the plain
language of the resolution and cabins the theater of the President's powers as
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IX. Analysis of the President's Authority to Designate American Citizens
as Enemy Combatants and the Role of the Courts and Counsel
Article H of the U.S. Constitution provides that all "executive Power" is
vested in the President.28 3 The President also is the Commander in Chief of
the armed forces.2" By their terms, "these provisions vest full control of the
United States military forces in the President." '285 In times of war, decisions
by the Executive Branch "are generally political and military in nature, and
neither judicially manageable nor reviewable." '286 Further, "[w]hen the
President acts pursuant to an express or implied authorization of Congress,
his authority is at its maximum, for it includes all that he possesses in his
own right plus all that Congress can delegate." '287
The military's capture and detention of enemy combatants involves a
fundamental executive decision under Article H of the Constitution,288
Commander in Chief to foreign soil. If that was the intent of Congress it was
masked by the strong and direct language of the Joint Resolution.
Id. at 732.
283. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 1.
284. Id. art. II, § 2, cl. 1.
285. Robert J. Delahunty & John C. Yoo, The President's Constitutional Authority to
Conduct Military Operations Against Terrorist Organizations and the Nations That Harbor or
Support Them, 25 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 488, 490 (2002).
286. Dreyfus v. Von Finck, 534 F.2d 24, 29 (2d Cir. 1976); see Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 296
F.3d 278,281 (4th Cir. 2002) ("In accordance with [the] constitutional text, the Supreme Court
has shown great deference to the political branches when called upon to decide cases
implicating sensitive matters of foreign policy, national security, or military affairs."), cert.
granted, No. 03-6696, 2004 WL 42546 (U.S. Jan. 9, 2004); Able v. United States, 155 F.3d
628, 633 (2d Cir. 1988) (recognizing that "[d]eference by the courts to military-related
judgments... is deeply recurrent in Supreme Court caselaw and repeatedly has been the basis
for rejections to a variety of challenges to... decisions in the military domain"); Padilla ex rel.
Newman v. Bush, 233 F. Supp. 2d 564,607 (S.D.N.Y. 2002) ("The 'political branches,' when
they make judgments on the exercise of war powers under Articles I and II, as both branches
have here, need not submit those judgments to review by Article I courts. Rather, they are
subject to the perhaps less didactic but nonetheless searching audit of the democratic process."),
aff'd in part, rev'd in part sub nom. Padilla v. Rumsfeld, 352 F. 3d 695 (2d Cir. 2003).
287. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579,635 (Jackson, J., concurring);
accord Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654, 668-69 (1981); Hamdi, 296 F.3d at 281.
288. See Duncan v. Kahanamoku, 327 U.S. 304, 313-14 (1946) (recognizing "the well-
established power of the military to exercise jurisdiction over members of the armed forces,
those directly connected with such forces, or enemy belligerents, prisoners of war, or others
charged with violating the laws of war") (citations omitted); Hamdi, 296 F.3d at 281 (noting
that "deference extends to military designations of individuals as enemy combatants in times of
active hostilities, as well as to their detention after capture on the field of battle").
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regardless of whether the combatants are American citizens. 9 or whether
their capture and detention occurs outside a zone Of active military
operations.29  Additionally, the Joint Resolution authorizing the use of "all
necessary and appropriate force against those nations, organizations, or
persons [the President] determine[d] planned, authorized, committed, or
aided the terrorist attacks that occurred... or harbored such organizations
or persons, ' contemplates the use of such lesser force as may be required
to capture and detain enemy combatants so as to prevent them from engaging
in further hostile acts against the United States. 92 Lastly, the detention of
enemy combatants finds support in 10 U.S.C. § 956(5), which provides for
the expenditure of funds for the detention of prisoners of war and others the
government determines to be "similar to prisoners of war." 93 But what
289. See Exparte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1, 37 (1942) ("Citizenship in the United States of an
enemy belligerent does not relieve him from the consequences of a belligerency which is
unlawful...."); Hamdi, 296 F.3d at 283 ("[B]oth lawful and unlawful combatants, regardless
of citizenship, 'are subject to capture and detention as prisoners of war by opposing military
forces."') (quoting Quirin, 317 U.S. at 31); Colepaugh v. Looney, 235 F.2d 429,432 (10th Cir.
1956) ("[The petitioner's citizenship in the United States does not ... confer upon him any
constitutional rights not accorded any other belligerent under the laws of war."); In re Territo,
156 F.2d 142, 144 (9th Cir. 1946) ("[lit is immaterial to the legality of petitioner's detention
as a prisoner of war by American military authorities whether petitioner is or is not a citizen of
the United States of America.").
290. See Quirin, 317 U.S. at 38 (recognizing that petitioners were not "any the less
belligerents if, as they argue[d], they ha[d] not actually committed or attempted to commit any
act of depredation or entered the theatre or zone of active military operations"); Territo, 156
F.2d at 145 (making the point that "all persons who are active in opposing an army in war may
be captured"); Padilla, 233 F. Supp. 2d at 610 ("[T]he President is authorized under the
Constitution and by law to direct the military to detain enemy combatants ... ").
291. Authorization for the Use of Military Force, Pub. L. No. 107-40, § 2(a), 115 Stat. 224,
224 (2001). Two commentators have observed:
The Joint Resolution's authorization to use force is limited only to those
individuals, groups, or states that planned, authorized, committed, or aided the
attacks, and those nations that harbored them. It does not, therefore, reach other
terrorist individuals, groups, or states that cannot be determined to have links to
the September I 1 attacks. Nonetheless, the President's broad constitutional power
to use military force to defend the nation, recognized by the Joint Resolution
itself, would allow the President to take whatever actions he deemed appropriate
to preempt or respond to terrorist threats from new quarters.
Delahunty & Yoo, supra note 285, at 516.
292. See Press Release, Department ofDefense, No. 497-02, DOD Responds to ABA Enemy
Combatant Report (Oct. 2, 2002), available at http://www.defenselink.mil/releases/archive.html.
293. 10 U.S.C. § 956(5) (2000); see Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 316 F.3d 450, 476 (4th Cir. 2003),
cert. granted, No. 03-6696, 2004 WL 42546 (U.S. Jan. 9, 2004); see also Amanda Schaffer,
Comment, Life, Liberty, and the Pursuit of Terrorists: An In-Depth Analysis of the
Government's Right to Classify United States Citizens Suspected of Terrorism as Enemy
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precisely is or should be the role of the judiciary when American citizens
that the government designates enemy combatants in the war against
terrorism attempt to challenge their detention?294 What about the role of
counsel in that process? From the discussion above, several principles
emerge.
First, American citizens designated as enemy combatants have a right to
challenge the deprivation of their liberty based on that designation by filing
a petition for a writ of habeas corpus.2 95 In responding to the petitions filed
by Hamdi and Padilla, the government has acknowledged that point.296
Second, and contrary to the Second Circuit's ruling, the designation and
detention of an individual as an enemy combatant, a procedure that finds its
291 vsteeorigins in the laws of war, involves the exercise of the President's powers
as Commander in Chief to provide for the national security and defense.2 98
Combatants and to Try Those Enemy Combatants by Military Commission, 30 FORDHAM URB.
L.J. 1465, 1479 (2003) ("The provisions of 10 U.S.C. [§] 956(5) support the 'expenditure of
funds for the detention of "prisoners of war" and persons - such as enemy combatants -
"similar to prisoners of war,"' indicating that Congress' understanding that the military can
capture and hold enemy combatants, including citizens, during wartime.").
294. One commentator has observed:
The correct balance to be struck in reviewing combatant status decisions will be
difficult. While strong deference must be given to the executive branch in this
area, care must also be taken to protect innocent persons wrongfully detained as
enemy combatants. Too deferential a review may equate to no review at all.
While no one wants to compromise our nation's security and intelligence interests,
neither should fundamental constitutional protections be compromised.
William Connelly, The Importance of Law When America Is at War, 35 MD. B.J. 28, 33 (2002).
295. See Hamdi, 316 F.3d at 464 ("The detention of United States citizens must be subject
to judicial review."); see also Meyerson, supra note 34, at 20 (arguing that "it is indisputable
that the Supreme Court has jurisdiction to review Government claims as to who is a combatant
properly subject to military tribunals").
296. See Padilla ex rel. Newman v. Bush, 233 F. Supp. 2d 564, 599 (S.D.N.Y. 2002) ('The
government has not disputed Padilla's right to challenge his detention by means of a habeas
corpus petition."), affid in part, rev'd in part sub nom. Padilla v. Rumsfeld, 352 F. 3d 695 (2d
Cir. 2003); see also Press Release, supra note 292 (noting that "[a]s part of its Returns in Hamdi
and Padilla, the government submitted ample factual evidence supporting its determinations that
Hamdi and Padilla [were] enemy combatants. These executive branch submissions to the
judiciary are literally unprecedented in our nation's long history of wartime detentions of enemy
combatants, and demonstrate [the government's] commitment to judicial review in this
context.").
297. See Exparte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1,27-28 (1942). See generally United States v. Salerno,
481 U.S. 739, 748 (1987) ("[I]n times of war or insurrection, when society's interest is at its
peak, the Government may detain individuals whom the Government believes to be
dangerous.").
298. See Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 296 F.3d 278,281-82 (4th Cir. 2002) (recognizing that "[t]he
authority to capture those who take up arms against America belongs to the Commander in
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The exercise of such power against the backdrop of the joint resolution,
when coupled with the concerns identified in Johnson regarding judicial
interference with ongoing military operations, point to a very narrow and
deferential judicial review. 2 Thus, an American citizen identified as an
enemy combatant because he was indisputably captured abroad in a zone of
combat operations will obtain "highly deferential" judicial review in
connection with a petition for a writ of habeas corpus challenging the
legality of his detention.3" Indeed, in such circumstances, if the government
responds "to the petition by setting forth factual assertions which would
establish a legally valid basis for the petitioner's detention," then "further
judicial inquiry is unwarranted.""'' When a citizen is captured on American
soil and designated as an enemy combatant, the designation should
withstand judicial scrutiny if there is "some evidence" supporting it.
3 °2
Finally, the role of counsel in habeas corpus proceedings to assist a
citizen challenging his enemy combatant designation is circumscribed by
constitutional and national security considerations. When a designation is
brought about by a capture in an active zone of combat operations abroad,
there does not appear to be any role for counsel.30 3 If the capture takes place
on American soil, however, a compelling argument has been made that a
citizen should be permitted to confer with counsel so as to be able to present
facts related to the petition.'04
Chief under Article H1, Section 2"), cert. granted, No. 03-6696, 2004 WL 42546 (U.S. Jan. 9,
2004).
299. Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654,660-61 (1981); Hamdi, 316 F.3d at 465 ("[I]f
deference to the executive is not exercised with respect to military judgments in the field, it is
difficult to see where deference would ever obtain."); Tiffany v. United States, 931 F.2d 271,
275 (4th Cir. 1991) ("Because providing for the national security is both a duty and a power
explicitly reserved by the Constitution to the executive and legislative branches .... the
judiciary must proceed... with circumspection.").
300. Hamdi, 316 F.3d at 477; see United States v. Lindh, 212 F. Supp. 2d 541, 557 (E.D.
Va. 2002) ("ITihe appropriate deference is to accord substantial or great weight to the
President's decision ... ").
301. Hamdi, 316 F.3d at 476.
302. See Padilla ex rel. Newman v. Bush, 233 F. Supp. 2d 564, 608 (S.D.N.Y. 2002), ajfd
in part, rev'd in part sub nom. Padilla v. Rumsfeld, 352 F. 3d 695 (2d Cir. 2003); cf. Hamdi,
316 F.3d at 474 ("It is not necessary... to decide whether the 'some evidence' standard is the
correct one to be applied.. . because we are persuaded for other reasons that a factual inquiry
into the circumstances of Hamdi's capture would be inappropriate.").
303. See Hamdi, 316 F.3d at 465 (petition failed as a matter of law); see also Tom Jackman,
Judges Uphold U.S. Detention of Hamdi: Courts Must Yield to Military on 'Enemy
Combatants,'4th Circuit Rules, WASH. POST, Jan. 9, 2003, at Al (noting that "experts said the
ruling effectively bars lawyers from the process").
304. Padilla, 233 F. Supp. 2d at 603; see Alejandra Rodriguez, Is the War on Terrorism
Compromising Civil Liberties? A Discussion of Hamdi and Padilla, 39 CAL. W. L. REv. 379,
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X. Conclusion
Notwithstanding the nature of the current "asymmetric war,"30 5 the
detention of enemy combatants is necessary both to prevent them from
engaging in belligerent acts and to attempt to gain intelligence about the
enemy and its plans.3°  In these times of armed conflict, it has been
persuasively noted that "[iut is a military imperative and an integral part of
the President's constitutional duty to defend our country. '30 7 Further, the
joint resolution plainly authorizes the President to "use all necessary and
appropriate force against those nations, organizations, and persons he
determines" to be responsible for the attacks in order to "prevent any future
acts of international terrorism" against our country.3 °s Whether in the field
of active military operations or in the larger zone of combat which includes
our mainland, the President has the authority to detain a person the
government believes is planning an attack against the United States on al
Qaeda's behalf.
3°9
The caselaw in the war on terrorism is developing. Noncitizens captured
and held in an area where the United States does not possess sovereignty -
at least as of now - do not have access to Article Il courts to challenge the
legality of their detentions.3 0 American citizens captured in an active zone
393 (2003) ("If, in fact, the detention of an enemy combatant who is a United States citizen is
lawful, then certain procedural safeguards must be delineated. Namely, the right to judicial
review and access to counsel should be granted to all individuals the government labels enemy
combatants."); Kacprowski, supra note 253, at 692 ("Allowing enemy combatants the right to
counsel to challenge their classification on habeas review can only help to develop the law of
war and answer the question of what constitutes a violation in the context of terrorism. It may
also give some constitutional protection to those accused of being enemy combatants.").
305. Barton Gellman, In U.S., Terrorism's Peril Undiminished, Nation Struggles on Offense
and Defense, and Officials Still Expect New Attacks, WASH. POST, Dec. 24, 2002, at Al (noting
how "[tierrorism in its latest form has brought home the paradox of 'asymmetric war,' in which
even a powerful nation may be badly hurt by an antagonist of incomparably lesser strength").
306. In re Territo, 156 F.2d 142, 145 (9th Cir. 1946) ('The object of capture is to prevent
the captured individual from serving the enemy.").
307. See, e.g., Deputy Attorney General Larry D. Thompson, Remarks to the ABA Criminal
Justice Section, Wash., D.C. (Aug. 10, 2002), http://www.usdoj.gov/dag/speech/2002/081002
abacriminaljustice.htm.
308. See supra note 26.
309. See Editorial, Fairnessfor Detainees, WASH. POST, Dec. 21, 2003, at B6 ("It's hard to
see how [the joint resolution] would not cover a person the government believed to be planning
an attack on al Qaeda's behalf. The laws of war and American constitutional law alike recognize
that part of fighting wars is catching and holding the other side's fighters.").
310. One respected commentator has argued:
The legal black hole in which this leaves any and all innocent detainees held
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of military operations have the right to seek judicial review of their
detentions in Article III courts but that review is "a highly deferential
one."3 t The Second Circuit's ruling that the President has no authority to
detain American citizens in the United States who may be planning an attack
on al Qaeda's behalf absent congressional authorization beyond the joint
resolution is not likely to be sustained on appeal." 2 Rather, the holding of
the district court that citizens captured in the United States enjoy the right
to judicial review of their detentions and such detentions will be upheld if
there is "some evidence" supporting them is likely to prevail. 3 ' This, then,
leaves the question of access to counsel. In the case of a citizen captured
abroad, while there does not appear to be any role for counsel in challenging
an enemy combatant designation under Fourth Circuit precedent, after the
intelligence collection efforts regarding such combatant have been
completed and national security concerns are no longer present, and as a
matter of policy, it appears that he may be afforded access to counsel. 1 4 In
the case of a citizen captured in the United States, counsel should be made
available to such a person in presenting facts contesting the designation.3"5
As the cases percolate, the Supreme Court is likely to, and in fact it may be
said that it has a duty to, address some of the important issues raised by the
detentions of enemy combatants at home and abroad and provide further
guidance regarding the application of the law in this area.3" 6
by U.S. forces abroad is both unjust and insulting to the international community.
If this is the law, then the law needs amending.
Fundamental American values and international norms require some kind of
due process for all prisoners, no matter where detained. Congress should now
force the administration to do what it should have done long ago: assign military
tribunals to interview every detainee and to provide all those who plausibly claim
that they are not enemy combatants with a fair opportunity to prove it.
Stuart Taylor, Jr., Opening Argument - Falsely Accused 'Enemies' Deserve Due Process, 35
NAT'L J. 785, 786 (2003) (emphasis added). The Supreme Court will rule on this issue next
year.
311. Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 316 F.3d 450,477 (4th Cir. 2003), petition for cert. filed (Oct. 1,
2003) (No. 03-6696), cert. granted, No. 03-6696, 2004 WL 42546 (U.S. Jan. 9, 2004).
312. See Statement of Mark Corallo, Director of Public Affairs, Department of Justice, on
the Padilla decision (Dec. 18, 2003) (announcing that the Department of Justice will seek a stay
and furtherjudicial review for the Second Circuit's ruling), http://www.us.doj.gov/opa/pr/2003/
december/03_opa_71 I.htm.
313. See Padilla ex rel. Newman v. Bush, 233 F. Supp. 2d 564, 610 (S.D.N.Y. 2002), aff'd
in part, rev'd in part sub nom. Padilla v. Rurnsfeld, 352 F. 3d 695 (2d Cir. 2003).
314. See supra notes 226-28 and accompanying text.
315. See supra note 304.
316. See Editorial, The Supreme Court and Sept. 11, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 5, 2003, at A24
("The court will soon have a chance.., to consider several cases posing the question of how
much, if any, our constitutional rights have changed as a result of Sept. 1I. It has a duty to step
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in and stand up for civil liberties."); Linda Greenhouse, Post-9/1l Detainee Cases on Supreme
Court Docket, N.Y. TIMEs, Nov. 3, 2003, at A16 (reporting that with cases flowing from the
September 11 attacks "now reaching the Supreme Court in substantial numbers, the court faces
a basic decision apart from the merits of any individual case: whether to become a player in the
debate over whether to set the balance between individual liberty and national security").
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